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THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE FIFTY YEARS AFTER SAX  
AND SOME THOUGHTS ON ITS FUTURE 
 
Michael C. Blumm* & Zachary A. Schwartz** 
 
The public trust doctrine was resurrected by Professor Joe Sax in 
a now famous article a half-century ago. Sax explored the doctrine’s 
history and maintained that it had contemporary significance at the dawn 
of the modern environmental movement in 1970. Sax thought that the 
historic use of the doctrine to prevent monopoly use of important 
waterways could be expanded to meet the necessities of the times by 
protecting important natural resources from unwise or unsustainable 
depletion for public use, including use by future generations. His vision 
ignited a substantial expansion in the scope and purposes of the doctrine 
over the past 50 years. Some of the most surprising developments have 
occurred internationally, which Sax’s article did not expressly anticipate.  
This analysis, written on the 50th anniversary of Sax’s article, 
examines the public trust doctrine both before and after the article, 
revealing the considerable effect it has had on courts and legislatures. In 
addition to suggesting the great debt public trust scholars and the public 
at large owe to Sax’s prescience, this article hazards some predictions 
about the likely evolution of the doctrine in the future. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The public trust doctrine (PTD) was practically reinvented a half-
century ago by Professor Joseph Sax in his famous article.1 Although the 
doctrine has been implicit in sovereignty at least since the Roman Empire,2 
Sax resurrected the public rights it recognized at the dawn of the modern 
environmental law era.3 He also presciently observed that trust resources, 
traditionally interpreted to center on navigable waters to promote public 
water-borne commerce and fishing, need not be confined to those 
waterbodies, but could be invoked to apply to wetlands, upland resources, 
 
* Jeffrey Bain Faculty Scholar & Professor of Law, Lewis and Clark 
Law School. We are grateful for the editorial review by Michael Benjamin Smith, 3L, 
Lewis and Clark Law School. 
** 3L Lewis and Clark Law School, B.A. Dartmouth College. 
1. Joseph Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: 
Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970). Sax’s article has been 
cited by 47 cases and over 1,100 articles, according to a search on HeinOnline, last 
accessed March 31, 2020.  
2. See infra notes 27–39 and accompanying text (discussing the Roman 
and English origins of the PTD).  
3. See generally RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 29–42 (2004) (explaining the emergence of federal 
environmental law in the 1970s). 
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and even the atmosphere.4 Sax unearthed the Supreme Court’s 1892 
decision in Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois as the lodestar case 
recognizing the PTD’s potency as a restraint against government perfidy.5 
But Sax’s treatment of the PTD largely overlooked the great 
expansion of the doctrine’s scope that took place during the late 19th 
century, as the Supreme Court approved lower courts’ expanded definition 
of “navigable waters” that included inland waterways that were in fact 
navigable, not just tidal waters as had been the case in England.6 This 19th 
century expansion is an important part of the PTD’s history in an era in 
which some commentators aimed to confine the scope of the doctrine to 
what they perceived to be its inherent limits.7 Sax’s article also did not call 
attention to the beginning of the PTD’s evolution beyond navigable waters 
entirely to include non-navigable waters whose bedlands were privately 
owned. This evolution also began in the 19th century and became quite 
pronounced in the 20th century.8  
Although Sax overlooked some of the great expansion of the PTD 
that occurred in the 19th and early 20th centuries, in the half-century that 
followed his article, the PTD fulfilled many of his predictions and more. 
Beginning shortly after 1970, the doctrine gave the public the right to 
protect the ecological and recreational value of tidelands in California;9 
recognized public rights to recreate on ocean beaches in New Jersey;10 
required evaluation of ecological considerations in the administration of 
 
4. Sax, supra note 1, at 556–57 (“Thus, . . . protections which the courts 
have applied in conventional public trust cases would be equally applicable and 
equally appropriate in controversies involving air pollution, the dissemination of 
pesticides, the locations of rights of way for utilities, and strip mining or wetland 
filling on private lands in a state where governmental permits are required.”). 
5. Sax, supra note 1, at 489–91. 
6. See infra notes 44–53 and accompanying text (discussing the 
expansion of the American PTD in the 19th century).  
7. See, e.g., James L. Huffman, Why Liberating the Public Trust 
Doctrine is Bad for the Public, 45 ENVTL. L. 337, 340 (2015) (“Sax’s invitation to 
liberate the public trust doctrine from its historical shackles—so enthusiastically 
embraced by many in the academy—has been largely rejected by the courts.”). 
8. See infra notes 75–87 and accompanying text (discussing the 
expansion of the PTD beyond title navigability); see also 2 WATERS AND WATER 
RIGHTS, § 32.03(a)(1) (Amy K. Kelly ed. 3rd ed. 2018) (discussing the so-called 
“pleasure boat” test for navigability). 
9. Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374 (Cal. 1971); see infra note 21.  
10. Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc., 879 A.2d 112 
(N.J. 2005) (applying the PTD to ensure public use of a private beach, applying the 
factors established by Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 
1984); see infra notes 156–72 and accompanying text (discussing New Jersey’s 
application of the PTD to beaches).  
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water rights in California;11 gave trust protection to groundwater in 
Hawaii;12 was construed to be implicit in the federal due process clause in 
an atmospheric trust case;13 and gave implementation force to an 
international treaty on climate.14 Several of these developments were 
beyond the Saxion vision a half-century ago.15 
At the time of Sax’s article—coinciding with the beginning of the 
modern environmental law16—courts had recognized public rights to 
access and protect navigable waters, but had yet to devote attention to the 
Illinois Central Court’s recognition that the doctrine’s application could 
extend to all natural resources “in which the whole people are interested” 
or which are the “subject of public concern to the whole people of the 
state.”17 Sax made that oversight apparent,18 and the scope of resources 
subject to the PTD has expanded ever since.19 
Courts’ recognition of the purposes served by the PTD were also 
in transition when Sax wrote. In a case ongoing at the time of his article,20 
the California Supreme Court eventually ruled that the PTD included 
 
11. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct. of Alpine Cty., 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 
1983) (“Mono Lake”); see infra notes 173–86 and accompanying text (discussing the 
Mono Lake decision).  
12. In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409 (Haw. 2000) 
(“Waiahole Ditch”); see infra notes 188–209 and accompanying text (discussing the 
Waiahole Ditch decision).  
13. Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224 (D. Or. 2016), 
overruled on standing grounds by Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 
2020); see infra notes 218–31 (discussing American atmospheric trust litigation). 
14. The State of the Netherlands v. Urgenda Foundation, Supreme Court 
of the Netherlands, ECLI:NL:PHR:2019:102 (2019) (“Supreme Court Decision”), 
aff’g State of the Netherlands v. Urgenda Foundation, Hague Court of Appeals, 
ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2015:7196 (2018) (“Court of Appeals Decision”); see supra notes 
262–68 and accompanying text. 
15. See Michael C. Blumm & Rachel D. Guthrie, Internationalizing the 
Public Trust Doctrine: Natural Law and Constitutional and Statutory Approaches to 
Fulfilling the Saxion Vision, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 741, 750–56 (2012). 
16. But certainly not the origin of environmental law, which arguably 
existed as early as the 1880s. See KARL BOYD BROOKS, BEFORE EARTH DAY: THE 
ORIGINS OF AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, 1945–70 (2009), reviewed in Michael 
C. Blumm, Debunking the “Divine Conception” Myth: Environmental Law Before 
NEPA, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 269 (2010). 
17. Ill. Central R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453, 455–56 (1892). 
18. Sax, supra note 1, at 556–57.  
19. See infra notes 156–281 and accompanying text. 
20. Sax, supra note 1, at 530–31 (mentioning lower court’s decision in 
Marks). 
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protection of recreational and ecological resources.21 Soon other courts 
would see that the PTD was more than a public access right to trust 
resources but also a vehicle to protect those resources for future 
generations.22 The libertarian-minded scholars condemned this judicial 
evolution as unwarranted judicial activism.23 
In the last several years, the PTD’s reach has extended 
internationally, with groundbreaking decisions in India, the Philippines, 
Pakistan, Colombia, and the Netherlands, among other countries.24 A 
number of decisions, both domestic and international, have located the 
public trust in constitutions,25 giving it a firm legal foothold. Perhaps the 
most arresting PTD decisions are those concerning its implications for 
governmental failures to combat climate change.26 
This article surveys the PTD both before and since Professor Sax’s 
article a half-century ago. Section I provides a brief overview of the origins 
of the doctrine, on which there has been some important new scholarship 
concerning its Roman roots. Section II explains the growth of public rights 
in navigable waters in 19th and early 20th century America, to which the 
Sax article gave only passing attention. Section II also examines the 
Supreme Court’s Illinois Central decision, considered by Sax to be the 
doctrine’s “lodestar,” but also discusses the public trust in wildlife and the 
extension of the PTD to non-navigable waters, both well underway by 
1970. Section III turns to Sax’s article, which gave the doctrine its name 
and made several other notable contributions. Section IV explores the 
growth of the PTD during the last half-century, focusing especially on the 
entrenching of the doctrine in domestic and international constitutions. 
The article concludes with some predictions about the PTD’s evolution 




21. Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971) (“There is a 
growing public recognition that one of the most important public uses of the 
tidelands—a use encompassed within the tidelands trust—is the preservation of those 
lands in their natural state, so that they may serve as ecological units for scientific 
study.”). 
22. See infra notes 222–42 and accompanying text. 
23. See, e.g., James L. Huffman, Speaking of Inconvenient Truths—A 
History of the Public Trust Doctrine, 18 DUKE ENVTL L. & POL’Y F. 1, 3 (2007); 
Huffman, supra note 7, at 339.  
24. See infra notes 244–91 and accompanying text.  
25. See infra notes 156–295 and accompanying text.  
26. See infra notes 222–43 and accompanying text.  
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II. ROMAN AND ENGLISH ORIGINS 
PTD critics have questioned the Saxion claim of the Roman 
origins of the doctrine, apparently in the belief that if its Roman roots were 
not genuine, the PTD could be exposed as an illegitimate threat to private 
property rights.27 The arguments of these critics have been undermined by 
two analyses of Roman law published in the last year, which suggest that 
the language of the Institutes of Justinian (promulgated in A.D. 533) that 
Sax referenced,28 was merely a codification of earlier Roman law, deriving 
from earlier treatises by Roman jurists Gaius (circa A.D. 160), Ulpian 
(circa A.D. 170–223), and Marcian (circa A.D. 220–230).29 
Hundreds of years before Justinian, Roman law recognized 
shorelands as public property, although the law tolerated private villas, 
which did not have the right to exclude fishers from accessing the sea.30 
Ulpian, in particular, recognized that the sea and the shore “are the 
common property of everyone, like the air; . . . [and] no one can be 
prohibiting from fishing.”31 Thus, the recognition of res communes central 
to the Justinian legacy turns out to be firmly established hundreds of years 
earlier. Although it is not clear whether the Romans divided ownership 
between trustees and beneficiaries, Roman law did recognize the state’s 
reversionary interest in the private villas on the shore.32  
 
27. See, e.g., Huffman, supra note 23, at 12–19 (2007) (relying mainly 
on two articles to discount the Roman origins of the PTD: Glenn J. McGrady, The 
Navigability Concept in Civil and Common Law: Historical Development, Current 
Importance, and Some Doctrines That Don’t Hold Water, 3 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 511 
(1975); Patrick Deveney, Title, Jus Publicum, and the Public Trust: An Historical 
Analysis, 1 SEA GRANT L.J. 13 (1976)).  
28. The passage from the Institutes of Justinian 2.1.1 (Thomas Cooper 
trans & ed. 1841), known as the res communes omnium (“things common to all”), 
reads: “these things are by natural law common to all: air, flowing water, the sea, and 
consequently the shores of the sea.” Sax referenced the passage in his article. Sax, 
supra note 1, at 474 n.15.  
29. Bruce W. Frier, The Roman Origins of the Public Trust Doctrine, 32 
J. ROMAN ARCHAEOLOGY 641, 642–43, 646 (2019); J.B. Ruhl & Thomas A.J. 
McGinn, The Roman Public Trust Doctrine: What Was It, and Does It Support an 
Atmospheric Trust?, 47 ECOLOGY L.Q. 117 (2020). After providing some context for 
the Justinian passage, supra note 28, Ruhl and McGinn observe that although the 
Institutes were “firmly within the core body of Roman law,” they were hardly an effort 
to create new law, instead being a synthesis of Roman law going back centuries in an 
effort to remove inconsistencies and obsolete principles. Id. at 130.  
30. Frier, supra note 29, at 645–46. 
31. Id. at 646. 
32. Id. at 647. 
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Later, in the 14th and 15th centuries, Venetian legal scholars 
erected a claim of prescription unrecognized in Roman law as a defense to 
the city’s claim of ownership of lagoons in the Adriatic Sea on which the 
city was built.33 But the Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius, in his 1609 treatise 
Mare Liberum, invoked Justinian’s res communes to refute Portuguese and 
Spanish claims of ownership of the sea and to justify freedom of the seas.34 
Meanwhile, in England, the Magna Charta had recognized public 
rights in what came to be called “navigable waters” in 1215, and a few 
years later an amendment known as the Forest Charter recognized public 
rights in royal forests.35 However, the predecessor most responsible for 
transporting the PTD across the Atlantic was Lord Mathew Hale, a 
distinguished jurist and Chief Justice of the King’s Bench, who wrote De 
Jure Maris, which was not published until 1787, over a century after Hale 
authored it.36 Like the Roman concept of res communes, Hale interpreted 
the Magna Charta to recognize public rights to fish in waterways that were 
“common highways.”37 Private shoreland owners had no right to exclude 
the public from such waterways; instead, the King had jurisdiction, to be 
exercised “not primarily for his profit, but for protection of the people and 
promotion of the general welfare.”38 Hale thus introduced the role of the 
sovereign as trustee over waterways that were common resources.39 
 
33. See Ruhl & McGinn, supra note 29, at 147. 
34. See id. at 149 (“Grotius deploys the evidence of Latin literature, 
especially the work of Cicero and Seneca, to argue that the sea, or at least large stretches 
of it, cannot be owned, but must remain accessible to use by all as provided by nature.”). 
The article proceeds to analyze at some length scholarship on the res communes concept, 
focusing on late 19th and early 20th century interpretations of the writings of Marcian 
and Ulpian and concluding that the inclusion of air in res communes was likely a 
reflection of the economic importance of bird-catching. Id. at 149–158. 
35. See Michael C. Blumm & Courtney Engel, Proprietary and 
Sovereign Public Trust Obligations: From Justinian and Hale to Lamprey and 
Oswego Lake, 43 VT. L. REV. 1, 6–9 (2018) (pointing out that these fishing and 
navigation rights benefited commoners, unlike most of the other provisions of Magna 
Charta, which largely benefited the nobility). On the Forest Charter, see Daniel 
Magraw & Natalie Thomure, Carta de Foresta: The Charter of the Forest Turns 800, 
47 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10,934 (2017). 
36. See Blumm & Engle, supra note 35, at 8 n.40. 
37. LORD CHIEF-JUSTICE MATHEW HALE, A TREATISE IN THREE PARTS, 
IN A COLLECTION OF TRACTS RELATED TO THE LAW OF ENGLAND 9, 21–22 (Francis 
Hargrave ed., T. Wright 1787). These waterways came to be known as navigable 
waters in the wake of The River Banne decision, 80 Eng. Rep. 540 (K.B. 1611), 
although there is some dispute over whether U.S. courts correctly interpreted the 
decision. See Blumm & Engle, supra note 35, at 7 n.34, 9 n.41. 
38. Id. at 6.  
39 . Id. Allowing the waterbody to be the subject of private claims of 
ownership could allow monopolization of the resource on which “the whole people” 
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III. THE PTD BEFORE SAX 
American courts recognized the American PTD before Sax wrote, 
beginning early in the 19th century, if not before. The foundation cases 
involved disputes over oyster harvests on the Raritan River (named after a 
local Algonquian tribe), which flows in central New Jersey east into 
Raritan Bay, near Staten Island. A half-century later, the Supreme Court 
recognized the inalienability of public trust resources in a case that Sax 
made the centerpiece of his analysis.40 Ensuing Supreme Court opinions 
quickly distinguished the jus publicum from the jus privatum at the core 
of the PTD41 and applied the sovereign ownership doctrine to wildlife.42 
Simultaneously, state courts began to recognize public rights in trust 
resources and for trust purposes far beyond the public rights recognized in 
the federal title cases.43 This section discusses these developments.  
A. The Dawn of the American PTD 
Hale proved quite influential in American courts. For example, in 
an 1805 case substantially reinterpreting the meaning of riparian water 
rights, Chief Justice James Kent cited Hale’s treatise in concluding that 
both freshwater and tidal waters were under “the servitude of the public 
interest, and may be of common or public use . . . as common highways 
by water.”44 Several decades later, the Supreme Court referenced Hale in 
a landmark case upholding state regulation of rates charged by grain 
 
depended for transport, fishing, and commerce. See supra text accompanying note 17 
(discussion of Illinois Central). Antimonopoly was and is a prime goal of the PTD. 
See Michael C. Blumm & Aurora Paulsen Moses, The Public Trust as an 
Antimonopoly Doctrine, 34 B.C. ENVTL. AFFAIRS L. REV. 1 (2017). 
40. Ill. Central R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892); see infra 
notes 54–65 and accompanying text.  
41. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 13 (1894) (“this title, jus privatum, 
whether in the king or in a subject, is held subject to the public right, jus publicum, of 
navigation and fishing”); see infra notes 66–69 and accompanying text. 
42. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 534 (1896); see infra notes 70–
74 and accompanying text (discussing Geer). 
43 . See, e.g., Lamprey v. Metcalf, 53 N.W. 1139, 1143 (Minn. 1893) 
(expanding the scope of the PTD to recreational uses); see infra notes 75–85 and 
accompanying text (discussing Lamprey). 
44. Palmer v. Mulligan, 3 Cai. R. 307, 319 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) 
(reinterpreting riparian rights to permit reasonable uses, discounting interferences with 
“natural flow”); see MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 
1780–1860, at 37–38 (1977) (discussing the significance of Palmer v. Mulligan in 
transforming water law). 
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elevators operating as adjuncts to railroads because they were “affected 
with a public interest.”45 
Hale’s influence was most apparent in the foundation PTD case of 
Arnold v. Mundy. In Arnold, Justice Andrew Kirkpatrick of the New Jersey 
Supreme Court ruled that Benajah Mundy and other oyster harvesters 
could exercise public rights to harvest in the tidal Raritan River despite 
adjacent landowner Robert Arnold’s claimed right to exclude them 
because ownership of adjacent lands did not include the bed of the river.46 
Kirkpatrick quoted Hale to the effect that “the common people of England 
have regularly a liberty of fishing . . . as a public common piscary,” which 
could not be denied by monopolistic landowners.47  
Kirkpatrick’s decision in Arnold was collaterally attacked in a 
case that reached the U.S. Supreme Court involving another oyster 
harvesting conflict on the very same Raritan River. The landowner 
succeeded in the lower federal court, but the Supreme Court reversed in 
Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee.48 Chief Justice Taney not only endorsed 
Kirkpatrick’s reasoning in Arnold as “unquestionably entitled to great 
weight,” he relied on Hale for the proposition that “the common people” 
 
45. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1876). The grain elevators 
functioned as common carriers, obliged to take all grain tendered to them by the 
railroads, and offering their services to the public at a fixed price. See Edmund W. 
Kitch & Clara Ann Bowler, The Facts of Munn v. Illinois, 1978 SUP. CT. REV. 313 
(1978). The phrase “affected with a public interest” is one which the Illinois Central 
Court would echo, see infra notes 54–65 and accompanying text. 
46. Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 42 (1821). J.B. Ruhl and Thomas 
McGinn unearthed an earlier PTD decision, Harrison v. Starrett, 4 H. & McH. 540, 
545, 548 (1774), concerning Sterrett’s large fill in Maryland’s Patapsco River, which 
interfered with the vessel traffic of his neighbor. After proclaiming the superiority of 
public rivers in the river and citing Justinian, the provincial court denied Harrison 
relief due to a failure to show “special injury” necessary to pursue a public nuisance 
case. See Ruhl & McGinn, supra note 29, at 134–35. An early PTD case that did award 
injunctive relief was Carson v. Blazer, 2 Binn. 475, 478 (Pa. 1810), concerning 
Pennsylvania’s Susquehanna River, in which the state supreme court announced that 
a shoreland landowner had “no exclusive right to fish in the river immediately in front 
of his lands [because] the right to fisheries [in tidal rivers] is vested in the state, and 
open to all.” But it was Arnold v. Mundy, which the U.S. Supreme Court later 
endorsed. See infra notes 47–50 and accompanying text. 
47. Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 74. Kirkpatrick supplied some updating to Hale’s 
Old English language. See Blumm & Engle, supra note 35, at 10 n.49. Laying the 
foundation for the modern PTD, Hale interpreted the Magna Charta to ensure 
landowners had no “privilege or prerogative” over a river on which the whole people 
depended; moreover, the king’s jurisdiction over a waterway was “not primarily for 
his profit, but for the protection of the people and the promotion of the general 
welfare.” Hale, supra note 37, at 6. 
48. 41 U.S. 367 (1842). 
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have “a liberty of fishing in the sea, creeks, or arms thereof, as a public 
common of piscary.”49 Taney announced that the Raritan River was “held 
as a public trust for the benefit of the whole community, to be freely used 
by all for navigation and fishery.”50 Professor Sax may have invented the 
term “public trust doctrine,” but the Supreme Court recognized the 
doctrine over a century before his article. 
B. Expanding the Geographic Scope of the PTD in the 19th Century  
The PTD the Supreme Court ratified in Martin v. Waddell might 
have been interpreted to be confined only to original states like New Jersey 
with royal grants, but within three years the Supreme Court expanded the 
scope of public rights in navigable waters to all states under the so-called 
“equal footing doctrine.”51 Consequently, by the mid-19th century the 
Court had significantly expanded the scope of public rights in navigable 
waters and their submerged lands.  
Before long, the Court expanded the definition of navigable 
waters beyond tidal waters to include inland waterways that were 
navigable-in-fact, first in federal admiralty jurisdiction,52 and then to state 
proprietary ownership.53 By 1876, the expanded definition of navigable 
 
49. Id. at 412–13, 417–18, citing Hale, supra note 37, at 11. 
50. Id. at 413 (emphasis added). State ownership of navigable waters did 
not prevent riparian landowners from “wharfing out,” so long that the wharf did not 
obstruct navigation, although wharfing out did not imply any private property rights 
in the submerged land, since “any encroachment upon the shore, or other part of the 
public domain, may at all times be restricted and controlled by legislation.” Gough v. 
Bell, 22 N.J.L. 441, 469 (1850). 
51. Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 228–29 (1845) (applying the state 
ownership doctrine of navigable waters recognized in Martin v. Waddell to the new 
states of the West under equal footing, reasoning that they should have the same 
ownership rights and public obligations as the original states). Even though the 
original states did not benefit from the equal footing conveyance of submerged lands 
and had developed their own state laws of navigability for land title purposes, the 
Fourth Circuit ruled that equal footing and associated federal land title rules applied 
to those in North Carolina v. Alcoa Power Generating, Inc., 853 F.3d 140, 149 (4th 
Cir. 2017) (en banc). 
52. The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. 443, 457 (1851); 
see Blumm & Engle, supra note 35, at 12 nn.60–61 (discussing Genesee Chief, which 
overruled The Steamboat Thomas Jefferson, 23 U.S. (1825), which had limited federal 
admiralty jurisdiction to tidal waters). 
53 . Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 336 (1876) (applying navigability 
under admiralty to proprietary ownership); see Blumm & Engle, supra note 34, at 12 
n.62 (discussing Barney). Over a century later, the Court clarified that the expansion 
of navigable waters to include those that are navigable-in-fact did not mean that tidal 
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waters, coupled with the federal equal footing doctrine, led both to 
expanded federal regulatory jurisdiction and to increased state proprietary 
ownership. Public usufructuary rights increased correspondingly. 
C. The Lodestar Case: Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois 
According to Professor Sax, a long-running dispute over the 
ownership of most of the inner harbor of Chicago was “[t]he most 
celebrated public trust case in American law.”54 The dispute concerned the 
Illinois state legislature’s 1869 grant of the bed of Lake Michigan to a 
railroad company, which would in all probability use its ownership to 
control shipping on the lake both to and from its shoreside tracks.55 An 
ensuing legislature thought better of the grant four years later and revoked 
it.56 Although it took some two decades for the case to reach the Supreme 
Court,57 the Court upheld the legislature’s right to revoke the grant without 
compensation in 1892.58 The Court, per Justice Stephen J. Field, explained 
that the state’s ownership of the lakebed was “in trust for the people . . . 
that they may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce over 
them, and have a liberty of fishing therein freed from the obstruction or 
interference of private parties.”59 Submerged lands had “different in 
character” than public lands available for sale, since they were trust lands, 
requiring “management and control” by the state.60  
Consequently, according to Justice Field, the state could “no more 
abdicate its trust over property in which the whole people are interested, 
like navigable waters and the soils underneath them . . . than it can abdicate 
its police powers in the administration of government and the preservation 
of the peace.”61 Thus, the Court held that the lakebed was largely 
inalienable, because privatization would “place every harbor in the 
country at the mercy of a majority of the legislature of the state in which 
 
waters were not always categorically included within the term. Phillips Petroleum Co. 
v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 475–76 (1988). 
54. Sax, supra note 1, at 489. 
55. For a detailed analysis of the case, see Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas 
W. Merrill, The Origins of the American Public Trust Doctrine: What Really 
Happened in Illinois Central, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 799 (2004). 
56. The 1869 grant was likely influenced by corruption, see id. at 887–
95, 927–30. 
57. See id. at 913–19, explaining why the case took so long to reach the 
Court. 
58. Ill. Central R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 187 (1892). 
59. Id. at 452. 
60. Id. at 452–53.  
61. Id. at 453.  
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the harbor is situated.”62 The result of such privatization of public 
resources “would be a grievance which never could be long borne by a 
free people.”63 Although the Court was careful to announce two exceptions 
to its non-alienation rule,64 Illinois Central established that resources of 
great public concern were held by the sovereign in trust for the people, 
largely inalienable, seemingly universal, and protected by searching 
judicial review.65 
D. Recognizing the Jus Publicum 
Just two years after its Illinois Central decision, the Supreme 
Court returned to the PTD in a case involving Pacific Coast tidelands. A 
landowner with a federal Oregon Land Donation Act grant claimed 
ownership of tidelands; a grantee of the state also claimed ownership. In 
Shively v. Bowlby, the Supreme Court affirmed an Oregon Supreme Court 
decision in favor of the state grantee, narrowly construing the scope of the 
federal grant.66  
Retracing the origins of the PTD and citing Hale, the Shively Court 
distinguished private proprietary rights—the jus privatum—from 
inalienable PTD rights—the jus publicum.67 The Court indicated that at 
the time of the pre-statehood federal grant the federal government held the 
tidelands in trust for the state, which would acquire them under equal 
footing at statehood, and that the trust was “incidental to the sovereignty 
 
62. Id. at 455.  
63. Id. at 456. 
64. The two exceptions the Court recognized were (1) “for the 
improvement of the navigation and use of the waters” (that is, for uses serving trust 
purposes); or (2) “when parcels can be disposed of without impairment of the public 
interest in what remains” (that is, non-impairment of remaining trust resources). Id. at 
453, 455–56. 
65. Professor Sax thought that Illinois Central established the “central 
substantive thought” in PTD litigation: “When a state holds a resource which is 
available for the free use of the general public, a court will look with considerable 
skepticism upon any governmental conduct which is calculated either to relocate that 
resource to more restricted uses or to subject public uses to the self-interest of private 
parties.” Sax, supra note 1, at 490 (emphasis in original). 
66. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894), aff’g Bowlby v. Shively, 30 P. 
154 (Or. 1892). 
67. Id. at 11, 48–49 (citing Hale). Separating the jus privatum and the jus 
publicum was conceptually significant because that distinction made clear private 
lands burdened with the jus publicum could be trust lands. 
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of the state.”68 Consequently, such pre-statehood federal grants would be 
upheld only in exceptional circumstances.69 This pre-statehood federal 
trust obligation indicates that the obligations imposed on the sovereign by 
the PTD are not limited to states. 
E. Establishing the Public Trust in Wildlife 
In 1896, two years after Shively, the Court extended the PTD to 
wildlife, upholding a Connecticut wildlife conservation statute that 
prohibited birds killed during the hunting season from being transported 
out of state.70 In Geer v. Connecticut, the Court, per Justice Edward White, 
reviewed ancient and English common law principles of sovereign trust 
ownership of air, water, sea, shores, stating that “[t]he power . . . lodged 
in the State, resulting from the common ownership, is to be exercised, like 
all other powers of government, as a trust for the benefit of the people . . . 
”71 The state’s sovereign trust over wildlife was “an attribute of 
government” to be exercised as a trust “represent[ing] its people, and the 
ownership is that of the people in their united sovereignty.”72  
This trust was sufficient to sustain the state’s conservation 
measure, as the Court announced that the state had “a duty . . . to enact 
such laws as will best preserve the subject of the trust, and secure its 
beneficial use in the future to the people of the state.”73 Geer’s recognition 
of the state’s trust obligations concerning wildlife untethered the PTD from 
navigability requirements, enabling states to extend trust obligations to 
those resources in which “the whole people are interested,”74 not just 
 
68. Id. at 54. The Court explained that lands subject to equal footing “are 
held by the United States for the benefit of the whole people . . . in trust for future 
states.” Id. at 49. 
69. Pre-statehood grants are upheld only in cases fulfilling an 
“international duty” or in the case of a “public exigency.” Id. at 49–50. Some have 
succeeded, e.g., United States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. 1 (1997) (ruling that a Department 
of Interior pre-statehood withdrawal of lands in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge 
included submerged lands, defeating an ensuing equal footing grant); Idaho v. United 
States, 533 U.S. 262 (2001) (deciding that a pre-statehood grant of Lake Coeur 
d’Alene within an Indian reservation defeated a subsequent equal footing grant). More 
typically, equal footing has led the Court to conclude that pre-statehood grants did not 
defeat equal footing; see, e.g., Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States, 482 U.S. 193 
(1987) (concerning a pre-statehood reservation of reservoir sites).  
70. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896), aff’g State v. Geer, 22 A. 
1012 (Conn. 1891). 
71. Id. at 529. 
72. Id. at 527, 529. 
73. Id. at 534. 
74. Ill. Central R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453, 456 (1892).  
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navigable waters. That untethering began almost simultaneously, in a 
pathbreaking 1893 decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court. 
F. The PTD Beyond Title Navigability 
The growth of the scope of the PTD under the expanding 
definition of navigability was soon accompanied by a surprising expansion 
from the states, which disconnected the PTD from title navigability and 
broadened the purposes of the doctrine. The bellwether case was Lamprey 
v. Metcalf, in which the Minnesota Supreme Court in 1893 rejected a state 
claim of ownership of a dry lakebed on the ground that the lake was a 
nonnavigable water at statehood.75  
But in dicta that would be repeated by many other courts, the 
court, per Justice William Mitchell,76 declared that states could define the 
scope of public rights in waterways. He announced that navigable waters 
were all those that were subject to recreational use, like “sailing, rowing, 
fishing, skating, taking water for domestic, agricultural, and even city 
purposes, cutting ice, and other public purposes which cannot now be 
enumerated or even anticipated.”77 This broad conception of public rights 
became foundational to the modern PTD. Justice Mitchell advised that a 
broad definition of navigability was appropriate because “[t]o hand over 
all these lakes to private ownership, under any old or narrow test, would 
be a great wrong upon the public for all time.”78 This antimonopoly 
sentiment has been a persistent theme in public trust litigation.79  
Lamprey was widely quoted and followed by courts in other 
states.80 Its recreational test for navigability is now the dominant state law 
 
75. 53 N.W. 1139 (Minn. 1893). An earlier case recognizing public rights 
in waterbodies whose beds were not state-owned was Inhabitants of West Roxbury v. 
Stoddard, 89 Mass. (7 Allen) 158, 171–72 (1863), where the Supreme Judicial Court 
ruled that the town of West Roxbury could not exclude the public from removing ice 
blocks from a Great Pond because “[f]ishing, fowling, boating, bathing, skating, or 
riding upon the ice, taking water for domestic or agricultural purposes, or for use in the 
arts, and the cutting and taking of ice, are lawful and free upon these ponds . . .” Lamprey 
cited West Roxbury, but since the latter involved an interpretation of colonial ordinances, 
it had less influence on subsequent cases than Lamprey’s common law interpretation.  
76. The namesake of what is now Mitchell-Hamline Law School. 
77. Lamprey, 53 N.W. at 1143. 
78. Id. Although the quotes above were technically dicta, the court 
applied them in State v. Korrer, 148 N.W. 617, 622 (Minn. 1914) (“Under the law of 
this state the state owns the soil under public waters.”). 
79. See Blumm & Moses, supra note 39. 
80. See Guilliams v. Beaver Lake Club, 175 P. 437, 442 (Or. 1918) 
(concluding a small lagoon, capable of floating only small crafts, was navigable-in-
fact); People ex rel. Baker v. Mack, 97 Cal. Rptr. 448, 451 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971) 
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interpretation, according to the leading water law treatise.81 Today, its 
recognition that public rights exist on all waterways capable of supporting 
recreational watercraft, regardless of bedland ownership82 has enlarged the 
scope of the PTD considerably beyond the navigable waterways subject to 
equal footing. In fact, the dichotomy between the scope of the PTD and 
federal equal footing doctrine may have been what Justice Kennedy was 
referring to in his PPL Montana v. Montana opinion when he suggested 
that while title navigability under the equal footing doctrine was a federal 
test, the PTD was a state-law doctrine.83 That observation has been 
misconstrued by one court as meaning that the PTD does not apply to the 
federal government.84 But the fact that the PTD has been considerably 
enlarged by state law beyond waterbodies whose beds are title-navigable 
 
(holding that waterways used for recreational purposes are navigable, citing 
Lamprey); Hillebrand v. Knapp, 274 N.W. 821, 822 (S.D. 1937) (“[W]hether or not 
waters are navigable depends upon the natural availability of waters for public 
purposes . . .” (citing Lamprey, 53 N.W. at 1143)); Roberts v. Taylor, 181 N.W. 622, 
626 (N.D. 1921) (“A public use may not be confined entirely within a use for trade 
purposes alone.” (emphasis omitted)); State v. McIlroy, 595 S.W.2d 659, 664–65 
(Ark. 1980) (holding that a river was navigable because it could “be used for a 
substantial portion of the year for recreational purposes”), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 843 
(1980); Elder v. Delcour, 269 S.W.2d 17, 26 (Mo. 1954); Smart v. Aroostook Lumber 
Co., 68 A. 527, 532 (Me. 1907); Muench v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 53 N.W.2d 514, 519–
20 (Wis. 1952).  
81. 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, § 32.03(a)(1) (Amy K. Kelly ed. 3rd 
ed. 2018) (discussing the so-called “pleasure boat” test). 
82. In some states, like Minnesota, the beds of waterways that are 
recreationally navigable are jointly owned. State v. Korrer, 148 N.W. 617, 622 (Minn. 
1914) (In a clear recognition of the distinction of the distinction between the jus 
publicum and the jus privatum, the court stated “[u]nder the law of this state, the state 
owns the soil under public waters in a sovereign, not a proprietary capacity, but the 
state still owns it, and the shore owner does not.”). 
83. 565 U.S. 576, 593 (2012) (deciding that Montana Supreme Court 
misinterpreted the federal equal footing test for riverbed ownership by failing to apply 
the “segment” rule to determine title-navigable waters).  
84. The D.C. district court in Alec L. v Jackson, 863 F. Supp. 2d 11, 15 
(D. D.C. 2012), misinterpreted Justice Kennedy’s dicta, 565 U.S. at 603, to mean that 
the PTD was inapplicable to the federal government. The district court in Juliana v. 
United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1259 (D. Or. 2016) disagreed (“I can think of no 
reason why the public trust doctrine, which came to this country through the Roman 
and English roots of our civil system, would apply to the states but not to the federal 
government.”), overruled on other grounds, 947 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2020). For a 
detailed evaluation of the district court’s decision in Juliana, see Michael C. Blumm 
& Mary Christiana Wood, “No Ordinary Lawsuit:” Climate Change, Due Process, 
and the Public Trust Doctrine, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (2017). 
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should have no effect on the applicability of the PTD to the federal 
sovereign.85 
By 1970, when Sax wrote his article, some elements of the PTD—
including sovereigns’ obligation to hold certain natural resources (those in 
which the “whole people” were interested86) in trust for the people, 
including future generations—were well established, if unnamed. Others, 
like the PTD’s application to wildlife and the role of states in expanding 
the scope of the doctrine, were less well recognized87 but equally well 
established. 
IV. THE SAXION PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE 
At the dawn of what has been called “the heyday of the modern 
environmental era,”88 Joe Sax’s The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural 
Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention revived an ancient doctrine 
providing citizens with a means to challenge government action or 
inaction threatening so-called “trust resources,” traditionally navigable 
waters and their bedlands.89 Sax’s resurrection of the public trust offered 
a legal doctrine with what he believed had the “breadth and substantive 
content” necessary to address modern natural resource management 
problems.90 The article was groundbreaking, not only for its revival of an 
historic, largely forgotten doctrine, but also, according to Professor Carol 
Rose, for “unhook[ing] it from its traditional moorings on and around 
water bodies.”91  
Sax believed the public trust doctrine to be an “instrument for 
democratization” that could inject a needed level of judicial skepticism 
towards “dubious governmental conduct.”92 Professor Holly Doremus 
 
85. The argument for the application of the PTD to the federal 
government is made in Michael C. Blumm & Lynn S. Shaffer, The Federal Public 
Trust Doctrine: Misinterpreting Justice Kennedy and Illinois Central Railroad, 45 
ENVTL. L. 399 (2015). 
86. Ill. Central R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892). 
87. Indeed, Professor Sax’s article did not mention Geer v. Connecticut 
or focus on Lamprey or its progeny. 
88. Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing “Environmental Justice”: The 
Distributional Effects of Environmental Protection, 87 NW U. L. REV. 787, 788 
(1993).  
89. Sax, supra note 1.  
90. Id. at 474. 
91. Carol M. Rose, Joseph Sax and the Idea of the Public Trust, 25 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 351, 352 (1998).  
92. Sax, supra note 1, at 491.  
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described Sax as the “architect of the modern public trust doctrine,”93 and 
by 2020 Sax’s article had been cited by 47 cases and 1184 articles.94 Even 
the doctrine’s critics have acknowledged Sax’s article as the “truly 
seminal” one.95  
Sax gave only a brief history of the public trust doctrine’s journey 
from Roman to English to American law, explaining the general rule that 
states take the title to waterbeds up to the high water mark in “trusteeship” 
for the public.96 He described the public trust as an inherent limit on 
government authority tied to intrinsically important public interests, not a 
property right granted to the public by the government.97 According to 
Sax, trust assets like historic fishing and navigation were “so intrinsically 
important to every citizen” that they warranted government protection 
from private monopolization. Further, other assets “are so particularly 
gifts of nature’s bounty” that they must remain accessible to all. Finally, 
“certain uses have a peculiarly public nature that makes their adaptation to 
private use inappropriate.”98 Sax construed several traditional public trust 
cases99 to mean that the government cannot make a grant to a private party 
 
93. Holly Doremus, In Memorium: In Honor of Joe Sax: A Grateful 
Appreciation, 39 VT. L. REV. 799, 801 (2015).  
94. Figures based on data from HeinOnline database, as of December 7, 
2020. 
95. See, e.g., Huffman, supra note 23, at 339.  
96. Sax, supra note 1, at 475–76. Sax thought that how this trusteeship 
restrained government dealings with the land was subject to some confusion. On the 
one hand, the trusteeship may “put such lands wholly beyond the police power of the 
state, making them inalienable and unchangeable in use.” Id. at 476–77. On the other 
hand, the trusteeship may imply “nothing more than that state authority must be 
exercised consistent with the general police power.” Id. The former describes a public 
right that imposes a restraint on the government, while the latter implies no restraint 
at all beyond the implicit restraint that police power be used for a public purpose. Id.  
97. Id. at 478–84.  
98. Id. at 485. 
99. State v. Cleveland & Pittsburgh R.R., N.E. 677, 682 (Ohio 1916) 
(“An individual may abandon his private property, but a public trustee cannot.”); 
Brickell v. Trammel, 559, 82 S. 221, 226 (Fla. 1919) (“States may . . . grant to 
individuals limited privileges in the lands under navigable waters, but not so as to 
divert them or the waters thereon from their proper uses for the public welfare.”); 
People v. California Fish Co., 138 P. 79 (Cal. 1913) (applying a more rigorous 
standard of review than used to analyze conveyances by private parties); 
Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. 53, 74–75 (Mass. 1851) (state grants of riparian 
land do not include the right to obstruct navigation); City of Milwaukee v. State, 193 
Wis, 423, 451–52 (Wis. 1927) (upholding the state’s grant of a segment of Milwaukee 
harbor land to a private steel company).  
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if the effect of the grant meant that the government abdicated its authority 
to govern.100 
Sax famously anointed the Supreme Court’s decision in Illinois 
Central,101 as the “lodestar in American public trust law.”102 The Illinois 
Central Court held the state legislature’s extensive grant of submerged 
lands along the Chicago waterfront to a railroad was beyond the state’s 
legislative power.103 The Court, per Justice Field, distinguished 
government lands intended for sale to the public from those held in trust 
and, according to Sax, established a principle of judicial skepticism at the 
center of public trust doctrine litigation; according to Sax: 
 
When a state holds a resource, which is available for the 
free use of the general public, a court will look with 
considerable skepticism upon any governmental conduct 
which is calculated either to reallocate that resource to 
more restricted uses or to subject public uses to the self-
interest of private parties.104 
 
The Illinois Central Court viewed the legislature’s grant to be at odds with 
the government’s duty to provide public services and benefits.105 For Sax, 
 
100. Sax, supra note 1, at 488–89; Ill. Central R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 
U.S. 387, 453 (1892) (“The state can no more abdicate its trust over property in which 
the whole people are interested . . . so as to leave them entirely under the use and 
control of private parties, . . . than it can abdicate its police powers in the 
administration of government and the preservation of the peace.”).  
101. 146 U.S. 387 (1892); see supra notes 54–65 and accompanying text. 
102. Sax, supra note 1, at 489. 
103. Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 453. There has always been some 
question as to the effect of the Court’s decision on the conveyance at issue: Illinois 
Central might be interpreted to make such grants voidable at the discretion of the state 
(“Any grant of the kind is necessarily revocable, and the exercise of the trust by which 
the property was held by the state can be resumed at any time.”), id. at 455, or void, 
wholly ineffective (“We hold, therefore, that any attempted cession of the ownership 
and control of the State . . . was inoperative . . . .”). Id. at 460. The Court waffled on 
the issue: “A grant of all lands under the navigable waters of a state has never been 
adjudged to be within the legislative power; and any attempted grant of the kind would 
be held, if not absolutely void on its face as subject to revocation.” Id. at 453. The 
issue did not affect the result in the case because the state sued to void the 1869 grant. 
104. Sax, supra note 1, at 490 (emphasis in original).  
105. Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 453 (“The state can no more abdicate its 
trust over property in which the whole people are interested, . . . than it can abdicate 
its police powers in the administration of government and the preservation of the 
peace.”).  
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the case provided a foundation for courts to infuse some democratization 
into public trust management decisions.106 
Sax explored a series of contemporary cases that he maintained 
adopted the skepticism that Illinois Central called for in reviewing suspect 
public trust management decisions.107 He devoted close attention to the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts’ decision Gould v. Greylock 
Reservation Commission.108 The Greylock court resolved a controversy 
over 9,000 acres of land purchased by the state for a public park on which 
a legislatively-created agency wanted to lease to a resort developer to build 
a ski development on 4,400 acres; about half of the park.109 Five citizens 
challenged the decision, charging that the legislation authorizing the park 
development was invalid. Although the court avoided invalidating the 
statute, it reversed the lower court’s dismissal of the case and struck down 
the lease and management agreement after a close examination of each.110 
According to the court, the Greylock Reservation, as a state park, could 
not be “diverted to another inconsistent public use without plain and 
explicit legislation to that end.”111 The court consequently held that the 
management agreement impermissibly delegated the agency’s 
responsibility to manage the park and also found “no express grant to the 
[agency] of power to permit use of public lands . . . for what seems, in part 
at least, a commercial venture for private profit.”112  
The Gould court never used explicit public trust language, but Sax 
maintained that the court imposed a “presumption that the state does not 
ordinarily intend to divert trust properties in such a manner as to lessen 
public uses.”113 By requiring “express legislative authority,” the 
Massachusetts court increased the transparency of public trust resource 
management in effect democratizing the policymaking process by 
insisting on express legislative approvals of conveyances of trust assets, 
even leases.114 
Although in 1970 the scope of the public trust seemed narrowly 
confined to navigable waters, Sax contended that the limitations imposed 
 
106. Sax, supra note 1, at 491 (“The model for judicial skepticism that 
[Illinois Central] built poses a set of relevant standards for current, less dramatic 
instances of dubious governmental conduct.”).  
107. Id. at 491–556.  
108. 350 Mass. 410 (1966).  
109. Id. at 411–12; see Sax, supra note 1, at 492–93. 
110. 350 Mass. at 427.  
111. Id. at 419.  
112. Id. at 426 (This anti-commercial sentiment is also found in the Hawaii 
Supreme Court’s decision in Waiahole Ditch, infra note 201 and accompanying text.).  
113. Sax, supra note 1, at 494. 
114. Id. at 496.  
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by the PTD could be applied “in a wide range of situations in which diffuse 
public interests need protection against tightly organized groups with clear 
and immediate goals,”115 in effect providing an antidote to agency capture 
by special interests.116 Gould was just one of many cases examined by 
Sax117 in which courts closely scrutinized agency decisions in order to 
protect trust resources.118 Courts had crafted what Sax called “the 
phenomenon of indirect intervention;”119 that is, imposing procedural 
requirements rather than inserting themselves in the decision-making 
process by addressing the merits of a public trust claim, which could create 
separation-of-powers issues.120 In other words, courts resorted to a 
 
115. Id. at 556. 
116. See generally George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 
2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971). 
117. See Priewe v. Wis. State Land and Improvement Co., 67 N.W. 918 
(Wis. 1896); In re Trempealeau Drainage Dist.: Merwin v. Houghton, 131 N.W. 838 
(Wis. 1911); In re Crawford Cty. Levee & Drainage Dist. No. 1, 196 N.W. 874 (Wis. 
1924), cert. denied, 264 U.S. 598 (1924); City of Milwaukee v. State, 214 N.W. 820 
(Wis. 1927); State v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 81 N.W.2d 71 (Wis. 1957); City of Madison 
v. State, 83 N.W.2d 674 (Wis. 1957); City of Madison v. Tolzmann, 97 N.W.2d 513, 
(Wis. 1959); Muench v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 53 N.W.2d 514, reh’g, 261 Wis. 515c 
(Wis. 1952); People v. Cal. Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576 (Cal. 1913); Marks v. Whitney, 
276 Cal. App. 2d 72, 80 Cal. Rptr. 606 (Cal. 1969), petition for reh’g granted, Civil 
No. 24,883 (Ct. App. Oct. 7, 1969); People ex rel. San Francisco Bay Conservation 
and Dev. Comm’n v. Town of Emeryville, 69 Cal. 2d 533 (Cal. 1968); Miramar Co. 
v. City of Santa Barbara, 23 Cal. 2d 170 (Cal. 1943); Ventura Port Dist. v. Taxpayers, 
Prop. Owners, Citizens & Electors, 53 Cal. 2d 227 (Cal. 1959); Martin v. Smith, 184 
Cal. App. 2d 571 (Cal. 1960); Haggerty v. City of Oakland, 161 Cal. App. 2d 407 
(1958); People v. City of Long Beach, 51 Cal. 2d 875 (Cal. App. 1959); City of Long 
Beach v. Marshall, 11 Cal. 2d 609 (1938); Rogers v. City of Mobile, 169 So. 2d 282 
(Ala. 1964); Texas Oyster Growers Ass’n v. Odom, 385 S.W.2d 899 (Tex. Ct. Civ. 
App. 1965); Parks v. Simpson, 137 So. 2d 136 (Miss. 1962).  
118. Looking at Wisconsin, Sax claimed its courts “developed two useful 
approaches . . . First, . . . specif[ying] criteria by which state dealings with such lands 
may be judged . . . Second, . . . recogniz[ing] that trust lands are of statewide concern 
and that authority to deal with them cannot be delegated by the state legislature to any 
group which is less broadly based. In this manner, [the judiciary] has fulfilled its 
function as an ensurer of the efficacy of the democratic process.” Sax, supra note 1, 
at 523. Turning to California, he found its courts to be “in accord with historic patterns 
elsewhere, utilizing the public trust concept to constrain activities which significantly 
shift public values into private uses or uses which benefit some limited group.” Id. at 
538. He contended that “[i]ndeed, it seems fair to describe the evolution of much 
public trust law in the United States as an effort to retreat from the excessive 
generosity of early legislatures and public land management agencies.” Id. at 547.  
119. Id. at 558–559.  
120. Id. at 558. Procedural requirements, of course, would soon be 
imposed on federal agencies by the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 
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legislative remand, requiring “a truly representative body” to “openly and 
explicitly” justify a public trust management decision.121 In public trust 
cases, the legislative remand served to democratize the process by, 
according to Sax, “remanding . . . after public opinion has been 
aroused.”122 This principle of public accountability fulfilled what Sax 
thought was the court’s fundamental function in disputes involving public 
trust resources.123  
Sax observed that a public trust principle of judicial skepticism is 
“properly invoked principally to deal with issues which . . . tend to be made 
at low-visibility levels.”124 He gave an example of a highway agency 
holding poorly attended public hearings due to poorly publicized public 
notice of its development plans affecting in a large geographic area.125 In 
such a case, “a diffuse majority is made subject to the will of a concerted 
minority.”126 Often, this sort of imbalance occurs when the government: 
(1) conveys public trust resources at less than market value for no obvious 
reason;127 (2) grants an exclusive usufruct in public trust resources to a 
private entity, undermining broad public use;128 or (3) reallocates diffuse 
public uses to private or narrower public uses.129 A variation on the third 
example was whether the resource in question is being used for its natural 
purpose, such as, in Sax’s words, “a lake being used ‘as a lake.’”130 In all of 
these situations, a legislative remand “serves to call attention to the 
inadequacies in conventional public techniques for evaluating resource 
decisions involving diffuse public uses.”131 In an effort to elucidate the 
judiciary’s role in promoting rational natural resource management, Sax’s 
article “added a powerful, if controversial, rhetorical element”132 to natural 
resources law. 
 Ten years after his 1970 article Sax, dissatisfied with the PTD’s 
confinement to a limitation on alienation of narrowly-defined trust 
property, authored a follow-up article: Liberating the Public Trust from its 
 
U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370h (2012). See generally DANIEL R. MANDELKER, NEPA LAW & 
LITIGATION (Environmental Law Series 2d, 2019 ed.). 
121. Sax, supra note 1, at 559.  
122. Id. at 560. 
123. Id. at 561.  
124. Id. at 559 n.268.  
125. Id. at 558.  
126. Id. at 560.  
127. Id. at 562. 
128. Id.  
129. Id. at 563. 
130. Id. at 565. 
131. Id. at 564.  
132. See Rose, supra note 91, at 352.  
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Historical Shackles.133 He described the essence of property law as “a 
respect for reasonable expectations.”134 In other words, “stability in 
ownership is what we protect with property rights.”135 Importantly, this 
stability was not meant to foreclose change, but instead provided for a 
transition rather than a collapse.136 As applied to environmental problems, 
change in use itself is not the problem, but rather a destabilizing rate of 
change.137 In Sax’s view, the public trust doctrine functions to “protect 
such public expectations against destabilizing changes.”138 With this 
perspective, the public trust doctrine can “embrace a much wider range of 
things than private ownership,”139 expanding the concepts of jus publicum 
and jus privitum to a variety of natural resources management issues. 
To liberate the public trust doctrine from its historical navigation 
shackles, Sax explored the “tradition of the commons in medieval 
Europe.”140 In feudal times, “as the common use of uncultivated areas 
became customary, it was natural for these customary uses to be described 
as legally compelled and required by justice.”141 Sax described the 
commons as an “agrarian economy of the forest”142 that was capable of 
thwarting a nascent capitalist ethos by allowing access for peasants to 
subsist on the unenclosed lands.143 He also noted that the commons arose 
from customary law, which is not unchanging.144 The commons was often 
conveyed to private use, but private title did not always exclude the 
public’s common use.145 Disputes over the use of the commons were not 
 
133. Joseph L. Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine from its 
Historical Shackles, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 185 (1980). 
134. Id. at 186–87.  
135. Id. at 188.  
136. Id. 
137. Id. 
138. Id.; see Michael C. Blumm, The Public Trust Doctrine and Private 
Property: The Accommodation Principle, 27 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 649 (2010) 
(explaining that the PTD did not aim to obliterate private property but coexist with it 
through what the article labeled the accommodation principle).  
139. Sax, Liberating, supra note 133, at 189.  
140. Id. 
141. Id. 
142. Id. at 190. See McGraw, supra note 35. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. at 189.  
145. Id. at 191.  
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usually over title or custom, but instead “the sharp disappointment of 
expectations,”146 such as a peasant’s loss of subsistence.147 
In the modern era, Sax analogized this antipathy to destabilizing 
change by pointing to City of Berkeley v. Superior Court of Alameda 
County,148 a decision of the California Supreme Court that resolved a 
longstanding dispute over San Francisco Bay tidelands, much of which the 
legislature had conveyed to private parties in the late 19th century.149 
Overruling previous decisions which declared the conveyances to be free 
of the public trust, the court held that the PTD burdened private tidelands 
that remained unfilled and unimproved tidelands.150 However, tracts 
already filled and improved and no longer adaptable for trust uses were 
free of the trust,151 a signature example of the PTD’s accommodation 
principle.152  
Although the Mono Lake153 controversy was still in the lower 
courts when he wrote, Sax anticipated that the notion of destabilizing 
change could prove influential in that decision, citing the impending 
ecological disaster from Los Angeles DWP’s export of the lake’s water.154 
His call for a judicial remand to the more representative branches of 
government was effectively answered by the California Supreme Court’s 
decision requiring longstanding private uses of water to be balanced 
against equally longstanding public uses (though unrecognized by legal 
protection) in a PTD analysis protecting the reasonable expectations of 
diffuse interests.155 
 
146. Id. at 191–92.  
147. See Connor McDermott, Monopolizers of the Soil: The Commons as 
a Source of Public Trust Responsibilities, 61 NAT. RES. J. ___ (forthcoming 2020), 
SSRN, Feb. 19, 2020, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3540669.  
148. 606 P.2d 362 (Cal. 1980), cert denied, 101 S. Ct. 119 (1980).  
149. Id. at 363.  
150. Id. 
151. The court accounted for both actual public use of tidal lands and a 
grantee’s 100-year chain of title to create a remedy accommodating both, despite there 
being “no doctrinal basis for recognizing these values.” Id.  
152. See Blumm, supra note 138, at 665–66 (“The accommodation 
principle . . . has become the chief characteristic of the public trust doctrine's effect on 
private property.”). 
153. Nat’l Audubon Soc. v. Sup. Ct. of Alpine Cnty., 33 Cal.3d 419 (Cal. 
1983).  
154. Sax, supra note 133, at 192.  
155. Sax’s observations from the feudal era were not an effort to apply the 
doctrine of custom to American law, but instead to shine light on the power that 
expectations and destabilization can have on property law. Id. at 192–93. He hoped to 
imbue the public trust doctrine with the lesson of customary law. “[T]he fact of 
expectations rather than some formality is central.” Id. at 193. Title is not irrelevant, 
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V. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN THE HALF-CENTURY AFTER SAX 
In the years since Sax wrote, the PTD has expanded considerably 
both in terms of the definition protected trust purposes and trust properties 
(the trust res). Some illustrative examples of this expansion are discussed 
below, including case law and statutes involving upland resources like 
beaches, Western water rights, groundwater, oil and gas revenues, and the 
atmosphere.  
A. New Jersey Beaches: The Public Trust Upland 
One of the first jurisdictions to expand the scope of the PTD in the 
wake of Sax’s article was New Jersey, the American homeland of the 
doctrine.156 The state’s beaches have long been in high public demand for 
recreation.157 Overcrowded beaches led some New Jersey municipalities 
to charge access fees, which the state legislature authorized.158  
In 1970, the year of Sax’s article, the Borough of Avon-By-the-
Sea began charging non-residents considerably higher fees to access its 
publicly owned beach than residents.159 A neighboring municipality, the 
Borough of Neptune, objected and filed suit, claiming that that all residents 
of the state had a right to use public beaches to reach the ocean.160 After 
the lower courts upheld the higher non-resident fees, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court reversed, recognizing that the claim was “in essence . . . a 
reliance on the public trust doctrine.”161 Citing to Sax’s article for the 
proposition that the doctrine applied to recreational use of beaches 
necessary to reach publicly-owned tidelands and the ocean, the court ruled 
that the PTD prevented the charging of discriminatory fees to non-
 
but “where title and expectations are not congruent, title should carry less weight.” Id. 
Sax mentioned that courts may protect “rights of private property owners and their 
rightful expectations;” however, with public trust claims, when the expectations are 
so diffusely held, courts have been less willing to directly interfere. Id.  
156. See Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 42 (1821); see generally supra 
notes 46–50 and accompanying text (discussing Arnold v. Mundy). 
157. See, e.g., Borough of Neptune v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 
A.2d 47, 49 (N.J. 1972) (“Avon’s year-round population of 1850, resident within its 
approximately seven square block area, is increased in the summertime to about 5500 
people (not counting day visitors).”).  
158. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 40:61-22-20 (West). 
159. See Neptune, 294 A.2d at 51.  
160. Id.  
161. Id.  
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residents.162 Although the case involved a public beach, the court signaled 
it might be open to extending public rights to privately owned beaches, 
suggesting that privatization of beaches might not relieve their owners of 
public trust obligations.163 
Over a decade later, the New Jersey Supreme Court revisited the 
beach access issue and extended the PTD to a beach owned by a “quasi-
public” nonprofit corporation.164 In Mathews v. Bay Head Improvement 
Association, the court recognized two distinct public rights as ancillary to the 
public’s ownership of tidelands and the ocean: (1) reasonable access through 
the beaches to reach the tidelands and ocean, and (2) reasonable enjoyment of 
the dry sand area.165 But not all beaches had public rights, according to the 
court’s decision, because the PTD warranted an accommodation between 
public access and private beach ownership.166 The court consequently 
established a formula for determining which New Jersey beaches had public 
access rights. The court introduced a four-part balancing test to ascertain 
whether public rights burdened the state’s beaches, depending on (1) the 
location of the dry sand area in relation to the tidelands, (2) the extent and 
availability of nearby public beaches, (3) the nature and extent of public 
demand, and (4) the past usage of the area by the owner.167 Using these so-
called Matthews factors, courts could recognize public trust rights in New 
Jersey’s uplands. 
 
162. Id. at 54–55 (citing Sax, supra note 1, at 556, 565). The court ruled 
that although municipalities can charge access fees, they may not discriminate against 
non-residents. Id. at 55. In an ensuing decision, holding that a municipally-owned 
beach resort controlling beach access could not limit its membership to local residents, 
the New Jersey Supreme Court expressly rejected the argument than the PTD did not 
extend beyond the high-water mark of ocean tidelands. Van Ness v. Borough of Deal, 
393 A.2d 571 (N.J. 1978).  
163. Neptune, 294 A.2d at 54 (citing Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 11 
(1894)), on the distinction between the jus privatum and the jus publicum and stating 
that “[i]t may be that some such prior conveyances [of beaches] constituted an 
improper alienation of trust property or at least they are impliedly impressed with 
certain obligations on the grantee to the use of the conveyed land consistently with the 
public rights therein.” 
164. Matthews v. Bay Head, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984). The Bay Head 
Improvement Association, a non-profit corporation, owned six of the 76 beach lots 
involved in the case and managed beach access to all. Membership in Bay Head was 
limited to residents of the borough, including non-beach owners. Id. at 369. 
165. Id. at 364–65. 
166. Id. at 365. On the trust doctrine’s “accommodation principle,” see 
Blumm, supra note 138 (supplying numerous examples of accommodation between 
public trust and private property rights). 
167. Matthews, 471 A.2d at 365.  
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In 2005, the New Jersey Supreme Court applied the Matthews 
factors in Raleigh Avenue Beach Association v. Atlantis Beach Club, in 
which a member of the beach association defended a charge of trespass for 
using Atlantis’ private beach.168 After a trial court granted the association 
a three-foot wide easement on the beach to reach the high-water mark, an 
appeals court extended the public rights to use the entire dry sand area and 
upheld the charging of reasonable fees, and the supreme court affirmed.169 
Applying the Mathews factors, the court (1) observed that the location of 
the beach provided easy access for pedestrians, (2) pointed to the limited 
availability of other public beaches, (3) noted the widespread public 
interest in New Jersey beaches, and (4) considered the fact that the beach 
had free access to Raleigh Beach prior to 1996.170 All four factors weighed 
in favor of public access.  
Subsequent cases included the New Jersey Supreme Court’s 2010 
affirmation that no constitutional taking occurred in a state beach 
nourishment case.171 And in 2012, an appeals court upheld a lower court 
decision that voided an agreement between the state and private beach 
clubs restricting public access on the restored beach as inconsistent with 
the public trust doctrine.172 
B. Mono Lake: Water Rights and the Public Trust 
Implementation of the Los Angeles Department of Water and 
Power’s (DWP) second aqueduct transporting water from the Mono Basin 
to Los Angeles under water rights granted by the state in 1940 led to a 
decision that Sax anticipated.173 The increased diversions consumed nearly 
 
168. 879 A.2d 112 (N.J. 2005). 
169. See id. at 118. 
170. Id. at 121–22.  
171. City of Long Branch v. Jui Yung Liu, 4 A.3d 532 (N.J. 2010). The 
court affirmed lower court decisions that the Long Branch nourishment was an 
avulsion, meaning that land ownership boundaries did not change, and that the Liu’s 
claimed taking was actually PTD land, so there was no government taking. Id. at 551, 
553, 555. 
172. Chisea v. D. Lobi Enterprises, No. C-296-06, 2012 WL 4464382 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div., Sept. 28, 2012). 
173. See Sax, supra note 133, at 192; DWP completed a second aqueduct 
in 1970 which would allow the full flow of four of the five feeder streams to Mono 
Lake. The state granted the original permit in 1940, despite acknowledging anticipated 
adverse effects to Mono Lake, based on the understanding that the decision was 
required by the water code, which puts domestic use as the highest use of water. State 
of California, State Water Resources Control Board, Decision 1631, Decision and 
Order Amending Water Right Licenses to Establish Fishery Protection Flows in 
Streams Tributary to Mono Lake and to Protect Public Trust Resources at Mono Lake 
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all of the flow of four of the five feeder streams that provided inflow to 
Mono Lake, causing the lake’s surface area to decrease by one-third and 
imperiling the ecology and scenic beauty of the lake.174  
After failing in the lower courts, the National Audubon Society 
won a landmark decision in 1983 when a unanimous California Supreme 
Court decided that the PTD applied to common law water rights,175 and 
therefore the DWP diversions had to be evaluated by the state under trust 
principles.176 Although the PTD did not require a cessation of all the Mono 
Basin diversions, the diversions were cut back significantly until the state 
could produce a PTD-compliant decision on the ecological effects of the 
second-aqueduct diversions.177 The state took eleven years to do so; its 
1994 plan envisioned restoration of about half of the elevation decline the 
lake suffered since the state granted DWP’s water rights in 1940, only a 
quarter of which had been restored by 2020.178 
The Mono Lake decision was significant for several reasons 
beyond averting an ecological calamity at the lake. The court applied the 
PTD to existing water rights for the first time, recognizing that the public 
trust antedated any state water right. This recognition, however, did not 
result in the court applying the prior appropriation law principle of first-
 
and in the Mono Lake Basin (1994), https://www.monobasinresearch.org/images/ 
legal/d1631text.php; see also Joseph L. Sax, The Limits of Private Rights in Public 
Waters, 19 ENVTL. L. 473 (1989); Joseph L. Sax, The Constitution, Property Rights, 
and the Future of Water Law, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 257, 269 (1990). 
174. Nat’l Audubon Soc. v. Sup. Ct. of Alpine Cty. (Mono Lake), 658 P.2d 
709, 711 (Cal. 1983) (“The ultimate effect of continued diversions is a matter of 
intense dispute, but there seems little doubt that both the scenic beauty and the 
ecological values of Mono Lake are imperiled.”). 
175. The court stated that the PTD and state water rights were “parts of an 
integrated system of water law.” Id. at 732 (proceeding to provide the California Water 
Resources Control Board with a framework to incorporate the PTD into water 
allocation decision making). 
176. Id. at 727.  
177. Not until 1989 were diversions from Mono Lake reduced, due to a 
preliminary injunction ordered by the Superior Court of El Dorado County. DWP did 
not export any water from Mono Lake following the injunction until the 1994 state 
water board’s decision allocating instream flows. Decision 1631, supra note 179.  
178. The Water Resources Control Board’s 1994 decision amended 
DWP’s water rights in order to allow Mono Lake to return to an elevation level of 
6,392 above sea-level, about 25 feet below pre-diversion levels plan, but significantly 
higher than they were in 1983, when the state supreme court decided the case. As of 
January 1, 2020, the level of the lake was recorded at 6,382.5 feet above sea level, still 
9.5 feet below the state’s goal but over 15 feet higher than they were at the time of the 
court’s decision. The Mono Lake Committee, Mono Lake Level, 
https://www.monolake.org/today/water (last visited Jan. 29, 2020). 
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in-time,179 which would have allocated all the water to trust uses. Instead, 
the court adopted a kind of equitable apportionment under which the state 
would exercise “continuous supervisory control” to ensure consideration 
of both the economic and ecological effects of actions on trust resources.180 
The court emphasized that the state legislature had “the power to grant 
usufructuary licenses . . . even though this taking does not promote, and 
may unavoidably harm trust uses” to maintain diversions central to the 
economy of the state, such as continued transboundary transfers from 
northern California streams south.181 On the other hand, the decision made 
clear that there are no vested water rights in the state; all water rights are 
subject to the PTD.182 The result is that water rights in California are 
subject to administrative reconsideration using trust principles. 
The California Supreme Court also affirmed the principle that the 
public trust included recreational and ecological purposes and must be 
“sufficiently flexible to encompass changing public needs.”183 These 
needs included “the scenic views of the lake and its shore, the purity of the 
air, and the use of the lake for nesting and feeding by birds.”184 Moreover, 
the court upheld broad citizen standing, proclaiming that “any member of 
the general public has standing to raise a claim of public harm to the public 
trust.”185  
The Mono Lake decision significantly expanded the scope of the 
PTD by including non-navigable tributaries that affect navigable waters, 
as defined by state law.186 A recent application of that “affectation 
 
179. Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 727. See Dave Owen, The Mono Lake Case, 
the Public Trust Doctrine, and the Administrative State, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1099, 
1101 (2012) (finding no widespread ensuing case law on the PTD). 
180. Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 727. The state has “an affirmative duty to 
take the public trust into account in the planning and allocation of water resources, 
and to protect public trust uses wherever feasible.” Id.  
181. Id.  
182. The court stated that the state may reconsider and reallocate water 
rights when taking into account diversions affecting the Mono Lake environment. Id. 
at 727; see Owen, supra note 179, at 1105 (discussing that the effect of the Mono Lake 
decision on the state water agency, despite a lack of ensuing case law).  
183. 658 P.2d at 719, relying on Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 
(Cal. 1971). 
184. Id.  
185. Id. at 716 n.11, citing Marks, 491 P.2d at 797.  
186. 658 P.2d at 720. In 1989, the California Court of Appeal interpreted 
the state’s Fish and Game Code to require protection of the fish in the Mono Lake 
feeder streams, effectively establishing minimum flow requirements. Cal. Trout v. 
Superior Court, 266 Cal. Rptr. 788, 791 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). The California Supreme 
Court subsequently interpreted this decision, in conjunction with its earlier Mono Lake 
decision on water rights, to establish two PTDs in the state: a statutory one for fish 
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principle” extended PTD protection to California groundwater where its 
pumping affected a navigable surface water.187 Groundwater is subject to 
the PTD in Hawaii without the condition of showing an effect on navigable 
waters, as illustrated by the next case. 
C. Waiahole Ditch: Groundwater in Trust 
The PTD in Hawaii, first judicially recognized in 1899,188 was 
incorporated into the Hawaiian Constitution in 1978.189 The Hawai’i 
Supreme Court interpreted the constitutional language to include 
groundwater exports from windward to leeward Oahu in the so-called 
Waiahole Ditch case in 2000.190 The exports began in 1913 in order to 
irrigate sugar cane, but the sugar production ended in 1995, prompting the 
Hawaiian Water Rights Commission to hold a contested case hearing over 
continued exports.191 In a 1997 decision, the Commission acknowledged a 
public trust duty and allocated roughly half of the water in the ditch to 
 
and wildlife, and a common law one for water rights. Envtl. Protection Info. Ctr. v. 
Cal. Dept of Forestry & Fire Prevention, 187 P.3d 888, 926 (Cal. 2008). Wildlife are 
expressly part of the public trust in California, Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. 
FPL Group, Inc., 83 Cal. Rptr.3d 588 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008); in Oregon, Kramer v. City 
of Lake Oswego, 446 P.3d 1, 12 n.12 (Or. 2019); and in most other states. See Blumm 
& Paulson, 2013 UTAH L. REV 1., at app. (cataloguing 47 states’ declarations of the 
public trust in wildlife). 
187. Envtl. Law Found. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 237 Cal.Rptr.3d 
393 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018), aff’g Superior Court, Sacramento County, No. 
34201080000583 (2014). 
188. King v. Oahu, Railway & Land Co, 11 Haw. 117, 125 (Haw. 1899) 
(“[T]he people of Hawaii hold the absolute rights to all its navigable waters and the 
soils under them for their own common use. The lands under the navigable waters in 
and around the territory of the Hawaiian government are held in trust for the public 
uses of navigation.”). 
189. Haw. Const., Art. XI, §1: “For the benefit of present and future 
generations, the State and its political subdivisions shall conserve and protect Hawaii’s 
natural beauty and all natural resources, including land, water, air, minerals and energy 
resources, and shall promote the development and utilization of these resources in a 
manner consistent with their conservation and in furtherance of the self-sufficiency of 
the State. All public natural resources are held in trust by the State for the benefit of the 
people.”  
190. In re Water Use Permit Applications (Waiahole Ditch), 9 P.3d 409 
(Haw. 2000); see Symposium, Managing Hawaii’s Public Trust Doctrine, 24 U. 
HAWAI’I L. REV. 1 (2001).  
191. See id. at 423–25. 
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leeward agriculture and the rest to instream flow.192 The Hawai’i Supreme 
Court reversed.193 
The court provided a veritable treatise on the Hawaiian PTD, 
explaining in some detail both the scope and substance of the doctrine. 
First dispelling the state’s claim that the state water code subsumed the 
PTD, the court explained that the state has powers and duties that it cannot 
legislatively abrogate.194 One of these was the PTD, an “inherent attribute 
of sovereign authority that the government . . . cannot surrender.”195 
Instead of the PTD being subsumed by the water code, the court used the 
public trust as means of interpreting the code, defining its limits, and 
“justify[ing] its existence.”196 The court declared that the PTD applied to 
both ground and surface water, discounted the lack of historic groundwater 
use by Native Hawaiians, and announced the flexibility of the doctrine as 
capable responding “to changing needs and circumstances.”197 
The court explained the first duty of the sovereign trustee was to 
protect public waterbodies for public access and use, including traditional 
public rights of navigation, commerce, and fishing, as well as recreation 
and preserving waters in their natural state.198 But the court also 
recognized that there was tension between non-consumptive trust uses and 
consumptive water uses, particularly domestic drinking water, a trust 
purpose, as well as Native Hawaiian customary uses, also trust uses.199  
The court emphatically rejected the notion that economic 
development was a trust use.200 Although the state could permissibly 
consider the economic benefits of private water diversions, the court 
emphasized that the commission’s PTD duty was “to maintain the purity 
of flow of our waters for future generations and to assure that waters of our 
 
192. See id. at 430 (allocating roughly 14 million gallons per day (gpd) for 
leeward agriculture and 13 million gpd for instream uses). 
193. At the time, the Hawai’i Supreme Court had jurisdiction over 
Commission decision appeals. 
194. Waiahole Ditch, 9 P.3d. at 442–43. 
195. Id. at 443. 
196. Id. at 445. 
197. Id. at 445–47. 
198. Id. at 448, citing Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 
452 (1892).  
199. Id. at 448–49. 
200. Id. at 450. The court observed that for the PTD to have meaning and 
effect, public rights in trust resources must be recognized as distinct and superior to 
competing private interests. Id. (“[I]f the public trust is to retain any meaning and 
effect, it must recognize enduring public rights in trust resources separate from, and 
superior to, the prevailing private interests in the resources at any given time.”).  
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land are put to reasonable and beneficial uses.”201 Fulfilling the trust 
requires that “any balancing between public and private purposes begin 
with a presumption in favor of public use, access, and enjoyment.”202 
Consequently, private commercial uses require a higher level of judicial 
scrutiny, with the burden on the private interest to justify the use.203 Since 
judicial review of trust resources decisions “provides a level of protection 
against improvident dissipation of an improvident res,” Hawaiian courts 
must take a “close look” at legislative or administrative decisions to ensure 
compliance with the trust.204  
In a pathbreaking interpretation of the PTD, the Hawai’i Supreme 
Court announced that the doctrine included the “precautionary principle,” 
under which the government trustee must not wait for scientific certainty 
to take remedial action to protect trust resources.205 In fact, the court urged 
the Commission to adopt “margins of safety” for instream uses.206  
The court sent the case back to the Commission, and the case 
bounced around between the Commission and the court for several years. 
Then, a 2006 Commission decision reserved roughly equal proportions 
between the windward and leeward users of around 12 million gallons per 
day (mgd) each, with the remaining 2.47 mgd instream until needed for 
out-of-stream diversions, which prompted a dissent.207 In 2010, the 
 
201. Id. (emphasis in original). The dual nature of the commission’s duties 
is due to the Hawaiian constitutional language, which requires the state to “conserve 
and protect” Hawai’i’s natural resources and “promote the development and 
utilization of these resources in a manner consistent with their conservation and the 
self-sufficiency of the State.” HAW. CONST., art. XI, § 1. 
202. Waiahole Ditch, 9 P.3d at 442. The court singled out three priority 
trust uses of Hawai’i’s waters: (1) domestic uses; (2) Native Hawaiian customary uses; 
and (3) maintenance of waters in their natural state. Id. at 448–49. Drinking water for 
domestic use is the highest priority use because of “founding principles of the ancient 
Hawaiian system.” Id. at 451.  
203. Id. at 453. The court noted that although the Commission’s decisions 
enjoy a presumption of validity, interpreting the obligations imposed by the PTD is a 
judicial function because PTD decisions are analogous to the duties imposed on 
private trustees, except that the beneficiaries are present and future generations. Id. at 
143. 
204. Id. at 455 (citing Arizona Ctr. for Law in the Public Interest v. Hassel, 
837 P.2d 158, 168–69 (Ariz. App. 1991); and Kootenai Envtl. Alliance v. Panhandle 
Yacht Club, 671 P.2d 1085, 1092 (Idaho 1983)). 
205. Waiahole Ditch, 9 P.3d at 468. 
206. Id.  
207. See Hawaiian Water Commission Splits Over Waiahole Water Case, 
Earthjustice (July 14, 2006), https://earthjustice.org/news/press/2006.hawai-i-water 
-commission-splits-over-waiahole-water-case. The dissent thought the 2.47 mgd 
should remain in the stream as a margin of safety, as called for by the supreme court. 
Id. 
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Hawaiian Court of Appeals upheld most of the Commission’s decision in 
rejecting a challenge by windward parties to two water rights the 
Commission granted to developer while upholding a challenge to a permit 
to a defunct golf course.208 Pending approval of more off-stream 
diversions, the leeward streams received a total water allocation of over 
15 mgd of a total of an average of about 27 mdg in the Waiahole Ditch 
system.209 
D. Pennsylvania Oil and Gas in Trust 
The Pennsylvania Environmental Rights Amendment (ERA) to 
the state constitution, approved in 1971 by an overwhelming 4–1 popular 
vote, called for a citizens’ right to a clean environment, referred to the 
 
208. In the Matter of Water Use Permit Applications . . . For the Waiahole 
Ditch Combined Contested Case Hearing, No. CCH-OA95-1 (Haw. Ct. App. Oct. 13, 
2010). See Restore Steam Flow, EARTHJUSTICE (Apr. 10, 2014), 
https://earthjustice.org/features/restore-stream-flow. 
209. See Regina Gregory, Waiahole Ditch Reservation, EcoTipping Points 
Project, July 2018, http://ecotippingpoints.org/our-stories/indepth/use-hawaii 
-waihole-ditch-water-restoration.html. The Hawaiian Supreme Court has issued at 
least two other two significant PTD decisions concerning Hawaiian waters since its 
original Waiahole Ditch decision. In re Waiola O Molokai, 83 P.3d 664 (Haw. 2004), 
largely upheld the state water commission’s decision to issue a water use permit to 
Molokai Ranch for over 650,000 gallons per day of groundwater pumping to 
implement a 30-year plan to develop low-impact tourism and light industry, along 
with the company’s agricultural and ranching operations. The court concluded that the 
Commission’s decision had fulfilled its PTD duty in balancing the competing 
demands for groundwater, but the court faulted the commission for failing to require 
Molokai Ranch to affirmatively show that its proposed use would not interfere with 
Department of Hawaiian Homes groundwater wells on the island. Id. at 694–95. Local 
opposition to the ranch’s development plans subsequently stalled the project, and in 
2017 the ranch was put up for sale, but it had not sold by 2019. See Gina Mangieri, 
Molokai Ranch sale has community talking public, private options, KHON2 (Feb. 2, 
2019), https://www.khon2.com/news/always-investigating/molokai-ranch-sale-has 
-community-talking-public-private-options. In a second case, Kauai Springs v. 
Planning Comm’n of County of Kauai, 324 P.3d 951 (Haw. 2014), the Hawaiian 
Supreme Court upheld the county’s decision to shut down Kauai Springs’ water 
bottling operations due to violations of county zoning ordinances, reversing a contrary 
circuit court decision. The supreme court ruled that the county planning commission 
had authority under the PTD to investigate Kauai Springs’ bottling operations for 
commercial use, and the doctrine imposed an affirmative duty on the company to 
demonstrate that its use was not harming trust uses like drinking water or other 
domestic uses, Native Hawaiian customary uses, maintenance of waters in their 
natural state, and existing lawful reservations of water. Id. at 982. See generally Ana 
Ching, Charting the Boundaries of Hawaii’s Public Trust Doctrine Post-Waiahole 
Ditch (draft, 2020). 
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state’s public natural resources as common property of all the people, 
including future generations, and expressly recognized the state as trustee 
of the state’s resources with an obligation to conserve and maintain 
them.210 The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court quickly undercut the 
ERA in a case concerning a street widening project that consumed some 
parkland in 1973 by ruling that all the ERA required was (1) compliance 
with applicable statutes, (2) a reasonable effort to reduce environmental 
harm to a minimum, and (3) the harm “clearly outweigh” the benefits of 
proposed projects.211 Although the state supreme court affirmed the lower 
court’s decision, the high court never adopted the Commonwealth Court’s 
three-part reasoning, and in two recent decisions involving oil and gas 
production overturned the test. 
In 2012, the state legislature amended the state Oil and Gas Act to 
permit “optimal development” of oil and gas in response to a widespread 
boom in production caused by hydraulic fracturing.212 The amendments 
displaced local zoning restrictions in favor of a statewide “use of right” 
everywhere, including residential, commercial, and industrial zones.213 
Citizens and local governments challenged the amendments as violating 
the state’s PTD, and a plurality of the state supreme court agreed.214 
Four years later, a majority of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
invoked the reasoning of the Robinson plurality in reversing the 
Commonwealth Court’s reluctance to interfere with state legislative 
 
210.  PA. CONST. art. I, § 27: “The people have a right to clean air, pure 
water, and to the preservation of the natural, scenic, historic, and esthetic values of the 
environment. Pennsylvania’s public natural resources are the common property of all 
the people, including generation yet to come. As trustee of these resources, the 
Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the people.”  
211. Payne v. Kassab, 312 A.2d 86 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973), aff’d, 361 
A.2d 263 (Pa. 1976).  
212. See 58 PA.C.S. §§ 2301–3504 (West 2012). 
213. See Robinson Twp. v. Pennsylvania, 83 A.3d 901, 914–15 (Pa. 2013). 
214. Id. at 981–82 (deciding that the amendments were incompatible with 
the ERA because “the degradation of the corpus of the natural resources trust, having 
disparate impact” on some citizens, violated the state’s fiduciary duties of prudence, 
loyalty, and impartiality); see also id. at 957 (discussing the fiduciary duties of 
prudence, loyalty, and impartiality). The plurality based its opinion on the PTD 
embodied in § 27 of the state constitution, although—of perhaps greater interest 
outside Pennsylvania—the court also noted that the PTD was enforceable under Art. 
I, § 1 of the constitution, which recognizes and preserves citizens’ inherent rights, id. 
at 948. A concurrence based its finding of unconstitutionality on substantive due 
process. Id. at 1001 (Baer, J. concurring). For a thorough discussion of the Robinson 
Township decision, see John C. Dernbach, The Potential Meanings of a Constitutional 
Public Trust, 45 ENVTL. L. 463, 478–517 (2015). 
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appropriation decisions.215 In response to budget shortfalls, the state had 
redirected some $335 million from funds generated by oil and gas leases—
funds that had been earmarked for natural resources conservation—to the 
state’s general fund.216 The court ruled that the fund was part of the corpus 
of the public trust, and that the state’s fiduciary obligations required the 
state to use the fund only for natural resources conservation.217 The court 
also confirmed that the ERA was self-executing without the need for 
implementing legislation.218 Thus, the state’s use of trust assets for non-
trust purposes was “a clear violation of the most basic of a trustee’s 
fiduciary obligations.”219 Applying the PTD to a legislative appropriation 
decision was unprecedented, and the invocation of private trust principles 
was potentially groundbreaking.220 
E. The Atmospheric Trust Cases 
In a group of cases perhaps beyond Sax’s 1970’s vision, the 
nonprofit group Our Children’s Trust has coordinated a series of domestic 
and international suits in an effort to force governments to curb greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions.221 The suits claim that unregulated GHG emissions 
damage trust resources, including the atmosphere and affected 
waterbodies, and that governments have inherent duties to protect those 
resources for present and future generations. This section surveys both 
domestic and international suits. 
 
215. Pennsylvania Envtl. Defense Foundation v. Commonwealth, 161 
A.3d 911 (Pa. 2017) (relying on Robinson Township). 
216. Id. at 930–32.  
217. Id. at 933–35, 937–38. 
218. Id. at 937–38. The court determined that royalties from oil and gas 
production are part of the corpus of the trust but sent back to the lower courts to 
determine whether rents and bonus bids are similarly part of the corpus. Id. at 935.  
219. Id. at 939. 
220. Id. at 931 n.23 (applying duties of prudence and loyalty). On the role 
of private trust principles in public trust decision-making, see John C. Dernbach, The 
Role of Trust Law Principles in Defining Public Trust Duties to Natural Resources, 
54 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 77 (2020) (suggesting that the duties of conservation 
easement trustees are more appropriate for interpreting the PTD than private trustee 
duties). 
221. See Mary Christina Wood, Atmospheric Trust Litigation Across the 
World, in FIDUCIARY DUTY AND THE ATMOSPHERIC TRUST, chap. 6 (Ken Coghill, 
Charles Sampford & Tim Smith, eds., 2012); Our Children’s Trust, 
ourchildrenstrust.org (last visited Mar. 31, 2020) (cataloguing ongoing proceedings in 
all 50 states and in over a dozen countries). 
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1. U.S. Cases 
Results of atmospheric trust cases in the U.S. to date have been 
mixed. A federal district court rejected one suit because it decided that the 
PTD did not apply to the federal government.222 The court misinterpreted 
a federal Supreme Court opinion in a case that did not involve a PTD claim 
at all.223 A Texas state court vacated a lower court decision in favor of PTD 
plaintiffs for lack of standing on the ground that neither the state 
Administrative Procedure Act nor the Water Code provided for judicial 
review of the denial of a petition for rulemaking to regulate greenhouse 
gas emissions by the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality.224  
The signature case upholding an atmospheric trust litigation 
(ATL) claim is the federal District Court of Oregon’s decision in Juliana 
v. United States, denying the federal government’s motion to dismiss the 
case.225 The court held that if the youth plaintiffs could show that the 
government knew for a half-century about the dangers of GHG emissions 
in the atmosphere and did nothing to prevent the danger,226 the plaintiffs 
could prevail on a claim that their constitutional and public trust rights had 
been violated.227 
 
222. Alec L v. Jackson, 863 F. Supp. 2d 11 (D.D.C. 2012). The district 
court decision was affirmed in an unpublished opinion, 561 F.Appx. 7 (D.C. Cir. 
2014). 
223. In PPL Montana v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576 (2012), the Court decided 
that the Montana Supreme Court employed an improper test for determining whether 
a river was title-navigable, a federal test based on river segments. On the district 
court’s errors, see Michael C. Blumm & Lynn S. Shaffer, The Federal Public Trust 
Doctrine: Misinterpreting Justice Kennedy and Illinois Central Railroad, 45 ENVTL. 
L. 399 (2015). 
224. Bonser-Lane ex rel TVH v. Texas Comm’n on Envtl. Quality, 438 
S.W.2d 887, 895 (Tx. App. 2014); see also, e.g., Sanders-Reed ex rel. Sanders-Reed 
v. Martinez, 350 P.3d 1221 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015) (finding that the courts cannot 
impose a public trust duty upon the state to regulate greenhouse gas emissions); Funk 
v. Wolf, 144 A.3d 228 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2016) aff’d 158 A.3d 642 (mem.) (Pa. 2017) 
(holding that the state’s Environmental Rights Amendment did not obligate the state 
to regulate greenhouse gas emissions).  
225. 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224 (D. Or. 2016), overruled on standing grounds, 
447 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2020). 
226. Indeed, the plaintiffs claimed that despite knowledge of the danger 
posed by GHG emissions, the federal government “permitted, encouraged, and 
otherwise enabled” fossil fuel development and use. Id. at 1233. 
227. Id. The court rejected government claims that the case involved a 
non-justiciable political question and that the plaintiffs lacked standing. Id. 1242, 
1248. 
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The court ruled that the plaintiffs constitutional rights were 
grounded in due process, as the right to a stable climate was no less a 
fundamental liberty right than the right to marry.228 Tracing the origins of 
the PTD to Roman law,229 as well as being implicit in due process, the 
court described the public trust as “the fundamental understanding that no 
government can legitimately abdicate its core sovereign powers.”230 
Characterizing the PTD as an inherent aspect of sovereignty, like the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court,231 the decision invoked private trust 
principles to interpret public trust duties.232  
As for whether the atmosphere was a trust resource, the court 
decided that such a declaration was unnecessary, since rising ocean 
temperatures and acidification were sufficient to show that GHG 
emissions damaged acknowledged trust resources like tidelands and the 
ocean.233 The court also rejected the argument that the PTD was 
inapplicable to the federal government, finding that that contention to be 
“implausible,” since “public trust obligations are inherent aspects of 
sovereignty,” and would therefore apply to both sovereign states and the 
federal government.234 Inherent in sovereignty, the PTD was not created 
by the Constitution but was instead a preexisting governmental duty, just 
as due process duties to protect rights to life, liberty, and property.235 
Agreeing with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the Juliana district court 
equated the sovereign trust limitation imposed by the PTD with the 
sovereign police power, as both are inherent limits and powers, and neither 
is alienable.236 The trial that the court approved was blocked by a divided 
Ninth Circuit, which ruled that the youth plaintiffs lacked standing due to 
 
228. Id. at 1250, citing Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) 
(finding the right to marry to be a liberty right protected by the due process clause). 
229. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1253–54, also citing Arnold v. Mundy, 6 
N.J.L. 1, 42 (1821), and Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois 146 U.S. 387 (1892).  
230. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1252. 
231. See supra note 220 and accompanying text. 
232. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1253–54, citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TRUSTS § 183 (1959); GEORGE G. BOGERT ET AL., BOGERT’S TRUSTS AND 
TRUSTEES, § 582 (updated June 2019). 
233. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1256. 
234. Id. at 1257. Similarly, the fact that trust obligations were inherent in 
sovereignty dissuaded the court from ruling that the federal pollution control statutes 
displaced the PTD, distinguishing American Electric Power v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 
410 (2010) (holding that the Clean Air Act displaced federal common law nuisance 
claims against major GHG emitters). The decision explained that PTD obligations 
cannot be legislated away. Id. at 1260. 
235. Id. at 1261. 
236. Id. 
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a limited judicial institutional capacity to oversee the design and 
implementation of a climate remedial plan.237  
The Ninth Circuit’s dismissal of the case was not a judgment on 
its merits. The court determined that “[t]he plaintiffs have made a 
compelling case that action is needed,” and that “it will be increasingly 
difficult for the political branches to deny that climate change is occurring; 
that the government has had no role in causing it, and that our elected 
officials have a moral responsibility to seek solutions.”238 Although the 
court averred that “[w]e do not dispute that the broad judicial relief the 
plaintiffs seek could well goad the political branches into action,” the 
majority decided “[t]hat the other branches may have abdicated their 
responsibility to remediate the problem does not confer on Article III 
courts, no matter how well-intentioned, to step into their shoes,” as the 
issues were committed to the political branches of government.239 
Consequently, the court “reluctantly conclude[d] . . . the plaintiffs’ case 
must be made to the political branches or to the electorate at large.”240 The 
Ninth Circuit based its standing ruling on an unprecedented, and arguably 
impermissible, invocation of the political question doctrine.241 A dissent 
agreed that “[n]o case can singlehandedly prevent the catastrophic effects 
of climate change,” but maintained that a federal court need not manage at 
the details of implementing a climate-change plan to “offer real relief,” 
and the fact that the suit could not “alone halt climate change does not 
mean that it presents no claim for judicial resolution.”242  
2. International Cases 
Courts abroad have not felt constrained by restraints like the 
political question doctrine. Their proliferating jurisprudence has moved 
the scope of the public trust considerably beyond the majority of U.S. 
jurisdictions and perhaps even beyond Professor Sax’s half-century old 
vision. We examine some of the more notable decisions in this section.  
 
237. 947 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2020) (importing the political question 
doctrine into standing analysis). 
238. Id. at 1175. 
239. Id. 
240. Id. 
241. A law professors’ amicus brief maintained that the political question 
doctrine has no role in standing analysis when there are manageable and discrete 
standards to resolve plaintiffs’ claims. Amicus Br.of Law Professors in Supp. of Pls’ 
Pet. for An En Banc Hr’g in Juliana v. United States, March 11, 2020, No. 18-36082. 
242. Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1175 (Stanton, J., dissenting). 




In a case with striking resemblance to Illinois Central and its 
undertones of corruption, the Indian Supreme Court relied on Sax’s 
“erudite article”243 to hold that a state government’s lease of ecologically 
fragile land to a resort violated the PTD.244 For five years, the government 
had refused a resort’s requests to lease additional land. 245 But in 1993, 
when Kamal Nath, whose family had ties to the resort, became Minister of 
the Department of Environment and Forests, the government approved the 
lease, a reversal which the Court concluded “[s]urely . . . cannot be a 
coincidence.”246  
The resort began substantial construction on the Beas River, 
redirecting its flow to prevent flooding at the resort.247 Drawing 
extensively on Sax’s article in examining the Roman and English origins 
of the PTD and its American application,248 the court determined that the 
PTD was grounded in natural law.249  
The Court ruled that the government cannot abdicate its authority 
over public trust resources by converting them to private ownership or 
commercial use and incorporated Sax’s principle of judicial skepticism 
into its analysis.250 Subsequent decisions from the India Supreme Court 
have continued to rely on Sax to reinforce and elaborate on India’s PTD,251 
finding the PTD to be constitutionally enshrined in due process,252 and 
expanding the res of the PTD. 
 
243. M.C. Mehta vs. Kamal Nath & Others, (Dec. 12, 1996) 1 S.C.C. 388, 
at *14 (India), https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1514672/. 
244. Id. at *19.  
245. Id. at *7–8.  
246. Id. at *7.  
247. Id. at *2.  
248. The court referenced, in some detail, Illinois Central, Gould v. 
Greylock, and Mono Lake, as well as several other cases examined by Sax in his 1970 
article. Id. at *16–18.  
249. Id. at *13 (“[a]n understanding of the laws of nature must therefore 
inform all of our social institutions”).  
250. Id. at *18.  
251. See, e.g., M.I. Builders Private, Ltd. v. Radhey Shayam Sahu, (1999) 
6 S.C.C. 464 (India) (enjoining construction of an underground shopping center 
located in a public park); Fomento Resorts & Hotels v. Minguel Martins, 1 N.S.C. 100 
(India 2009) (finding a violation of the PTD when a resort constructed facilities that 
blocked a public path to a public beach); Reliance Nat. Res. Ltd. v. Reliance Indus. 
Ltd., 7 S.C.C. 129 pt. I, ¶ 11 (India 2010) (applying the PTD to natural gas deposits); 
see also Blumm & Guthrie, Internationalizing, supra note 15, at 760–65.  
252. M.I. Builders, 6 S.C.C. at 466.  
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b. The Philippines 
The Philippines Constitution requires the government to “protect 
and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in 
accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.”253 In 1990, Filipino 
schoolchildren filed a class action lawsuit challenging timber licenses 
granted by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources.254 
After the trial court’s dismissal for lack of a specific legal right to sue, the 
Philippines Supreme Court reversed, finding a valid claim under the 
constitutional language, enabling the schoolchildren to file a class action 
lawsuit on behalf of themselves as well as succeeding generations.255 
Rejecting an argument that logging was better suited for the legislative or 
executive branches, the Court declared that the right to a balanced and 
healthful ecology “belongs to a different category of rights altogether for 
it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation . . . 
which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions.”256 
This public right imposes a “correlative duty to refrain from impairing the 
environment.”257  
Oposa turned out to be an empty endorsement of the PTD in terms 
of logging.258 But egregious pollution of Manila Bay, a popular tourist 
destination, prompted the Supreme Court of the Philippines to issue a far-
reaching order in 2008 that extended to dozens of agencies and called for 
environmental public education.259 In Metro Manila Development 
Authority v. Concerned Citizens of Manila Bay, the court reiterated 
Oposa’s recognition of a natural right to a “balanced and healthful 
ecology” and rejected the agencies’ argument that statutory provisions 
 
253. CONST. art. II, § 16 (Phil.)  
254. Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., G.R. No. 101083, 174, 177 (S.C., Jul. 30, 
1993) (Phil.).  
255. Id.  
256. Id. at 188.  
257. Id. 
258. Although the Oposa decision was a ringing endorsement of the PTD 
as an inherent in the Constitution as well as a natural right, the Court failed to enjoin 
the logging, which continued on largely unabated. See Dante B. Gatmaytan, The 
Illusion of Intergenerational Equity: Oposa v. Factoran as a Pyrrhic Victory, 18 GEO. 
INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 457 (2003). 
259. Metro. Manila Dev. Auth. v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay, 
G.R. Nos. 171947–48 574 S.C.R.A. 661 (S.C. 2008) (Phil.) (Metro Manila), 
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/dec2008/gr_171947_2008.html; see Presbitero J. 
Velasco, Jr., Manila Bay: A Daunting Challenge in Environmental Rehabilitation and 
Protection, 11 OR. REV. INT’L L. 441 (2009) (Associate Justice of the Supreme Court 
of the Philippines and author of the Metro Manila decision, describing the remedy the 
Court ordered); see also Blumm & Guthrie, supra note 15, at 770–76.  
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protecting Manila Bay were discretionary. Instead, the court found the 
duties to be obligatory and issued a writ of mandamus, forcing compliance 
with the statutes.260  
c. Africa: Kenya, Uganda, and South Africa 
Several courts in African nations have located the PTD within 
their constitutions, all of which were ratified relatively recently and 
include protections for the environment and natural resources.261 For 
example, the High Court of Uganda held that the Ugandan federal 
government breached the PTD in granting a 50-year permit to a sugar 
refinery, allowing the refinery to clear a forest for plantation lands.262 
Notably, the project faced strong opposition from the local community, 
and the court interpreted the PTD to require local consent, along with 
federal consent.263  
In Kenya, the High Court at Nairobi expounded on the PTD in a 
2006 criminal case in which the government sought sanctions against 
polluters discharging raw sewage into the Kiserian River.264 Although the 
court found the proceedings to violate due process because the government 
only sought sanctions against twenty-three of approximately 100 
dischargers, the court took up the PTD on its own motion and ordered the 
Ministry of Water to construct a treatment plant.265 The Kenyan court 
interpreted the PTD to be part of Kenya constitutional right to life, holding 
“[t]he right to a clean environment is primary to all creatures, including 
man. It is inherent from the act of creation, the recent restatement in the 
Statutes and Constitutions of the world notwithstanding.”266 Kenya 
 
260. Metro Manila, 574 S.C.R.A. at *11–13. In particular, the Court 
ordered compliance with § 25 of the Local Government Code of 1991, requiring that 
“the President shall exercise general supervision over local government units to ensure 
that their acts are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions,” as well 
as several provisions of the country’s Clean Water Act and other pollution control 
provisions. Id.  
261. See Constitution of the Republic of Uganda [CRU] art. 13; id. arts. 
26, 42, 46 (2010) (Kenya); S. AFR. CONST., 1996; see also Blumm & Guthrie, supra 
note 15, at 777–94.  
262. Advocates Coal. for Dev. & Env’t v. Att’y Gen. (ACODE), Misc. 
Cause No. 0100 of 2004 (July 11, 2005) (Uganda). 
263. Id.  
264. Waweru v. Republic, (2006) 1 K.L.R. 677, 677 (H.C.K.) (Kenya). 
265. Id. at 692.  
266. Id. at 687.  
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subsequently ratified a new constitution in 2010 which included 
provisions expressly incorporating PTD principles.267  
The PTD is also deeply rooted in South Africa’s 1996 
Constitution, which contains broad public trust language within its bill of 
rights.268 The constitution imposes affirmative duties to protect the 
environment, and the South African legislature has enacted several 
environmental statutes that expressly incorporate the PTD.269 These 
statutes codify an expansive public trust that incorporates both traditional 
and non-traditional resources.270  
d. The Netherlands 
In a landmark decision from The Netherlands, the Dutch Supreme 
Court affirmed an appellate decision holding that the Dutch government’s 
carbon-emissions reduction target for 2020 was inadequate to prevent 
dangerous climate change.271 Prior to 2011, the Netherlands had adopted 
a target of 30 percent carbon emission reductions, but adjusted it down to 
20 percent to match the European Union-wide 20 percent reduction 
target.272 The Urgenda Foundation claimed this carbon reduction target 
was not an ambitious enough goal to prevent dangerous climate change, 
relying on extensive scientific data and treaty obligations to demonstrate 
the necessity of keeping atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations below 
 
267. CONST. arts. 26, 42, 46 (2010) (Kenya). 
268. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 24 (“Everyone has the right to an 
environment that is not harmful to their health or wellbeing; and to have the 
environment protected, for the benefit of present and future generations, through 
reasonable legislative and other measures that—(i) prevent pollution and ecological 
degradation; (ii) promote conservation; and (iii) secure ecologically sustainable 
development and use of natural resources while promoting justifiable economic and 
social development.”).  
269. National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 (“NEMA”) § 
2(4)(o) (S. Afr.); National Water Act 36 of 1998 § 3(1) (S.Afr.); Mineral and 
Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002 (S. Afr.); National Environmental 
Management: Biodiversity Act of 2004 § 3(a) (S. Afr.); see Blumm & Guthrie, supra 
note 15, at 788–91.  
270. Id.; see also David Takacs, The Public Trust Doctrine, 
Environmental Human Rights, and the Future of Private Property, 16 N.Y.U. ENVTL. 
L.J. 711, 740–47 (2008).  
271. The State of the Netherlands v. Urgenda Foundation, Supreme Court 
of the Netherlands, ECLI:NL:PHR:2019:102 (2019) (“Supreme Court Decision”), 
aff’g State of the Netherlands v. Urgenda Foundation, Hague Court of Appeals, 
ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2015:7196 (2018) (“Urgenda? Court of Appeals Decision”).  
272. Urgenda Court of Appeals Decision, at ¶ 21.  
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450 parts per million.273 The court held that articles 2 and 8 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) required the Dutch 
government “to take measures to counter the genuine threat of dangerous 
climate change.”274  
Although the Supreme Court opinion contained less explicit PTD 
language, focusing more on separation of powers issues, the opinion 
affirmed the Court of Appeals’ reasoning, which had interpreted the right 
to life articulated in articles 2 and 8 of the ECHR as imposing a duty of 
care requiring “concrete actions to prevent a future violation of these 
interests.”275 The court found the Dutch government’s downward 
adjustment of its emissions target was a violation of its public trust duties 
because the government had previously obligated itself to a greater 
reduction by treaty.276 Addressing the state’s argument that the order to 
achieve a 25 percent reduction by 2020 amounted to a legislative order 
beyond the court’s jurisdiction, the Supreme Court held that the order 
provided the government with sufficient discretion in enacting specific 
legislative measures to withstand separation of powers arguments.277 This 
decision was a sharp contrast to the Ninth Circuit’s Juliana decision, in 
which the court held that the injunctive relief sought by the plaintiffs was 
beyond the institutional capacity a court could impose on the federal 
government.278  
e. Pakistan 
Pakistan courts have found the PTD to be embedded within that 
country’s constitutional right to life, which includes protection of 
environmental health.279 The Pakistan Supreme Court first recognized the 
PTD in a 1992 decision, In re Human Rights Case (Balochistan).280 In 
 
273. Id. at ¶ 3.8, 4–18.  
274. Urgenda Supreme Court Decision, at ¶ 5.6.2; Article 2 of the ECHR 
protects the right to life and Article 8 protects the right to respect for private and family 
life, both of which, according to the Court, relate to environmental issues. Id. at ¶ 
5.6.2–5.6.3.  
275. Urgenda Court of Appeals Decision, at ¶ 41.  
276. Id. at ¶ 73.  
277. Id. at ¶ 8.2.7.  
278. Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2020), rev’g Juliana 
v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224 (D. Or. 2016); see also State of Netherlands v. 
Urgenda Foundation, 132 HARV. L. REV. 2090 (2019) (discussing the court of appeals 
decision).  
279. PAKISTAN CONST. ART. 9 (“[n]o person shall be deprived of life or 
liberty save in accordance with law”); see Blumm & Guthrie, supra note 15, at 766–70. 
280. (1992) 1994 PLD (SC) 102 (Pak.). 
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Balochistan, a case of original Supreme Court jurisdiction in response to 
a newspaper article describing proposed dumping of nuclear and industrial 
waste in coastal areas,281 the Supreme Court held that the environmental 
harm caused by the dumping would be a violation of Article 9 of the 
Constitution, implying that the right to life includes the right to a healthy 
environment.282  
In 2015, a Pakistan appellate court, in Leghari v. Federation of 
Pakistan, relied on the same fundamental principle in deciding not only 
that climate inaction by the government was a violation of Article 9.283 The 
court proceeded to issue a directive to create government institutions to 
address climate change,284 including a Climate Change Commission and 
appointed 21 high-level cabinet officials to the commission.285 A group of 
Pakistani women recently filed a lawsuit, relying on Leghari, alleging that 
Pakistani government’s inaction on climate violated their right to life as 
well as that of future generations.286 
f. Colombia 
In Colombia, a group of children prevailed on their claim that the 
government’s failure to reduce deforestation and address climate change 
violated their fundamental rights.287 In Future Generations v. Ministry of 
Environment and Others, the plaintiffs asked the court to enjoin the 
development of an area of the Amazon rainforest due to the forest’s role 
as a carbon sink critical to prevent drastic climate change.288 The Supreme 
Court reversed the lower court decision, holding that the right to life is 
“substantially linked and determined by the environment and the 
ecosystem.”289  
 
281. Id. at ¶ 1.  
282. Id. “No person shall be deprived of life or liberty save in accordance 
with law.” PAKISTAN CONST. art. 9.  
283. (2016) W.P. No. 25501/2015 at *1–2, *4 (Pak.).  
284. Id. at *6–7.  
285. Id.  
286. See Maria Khan et al. v. Federation of Pakistan et al. Writ Petition 
No. 8960 of 2019 (Lahore High Court) (Pakistan). 
287. Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.][Supreme Court], Apr. 15, 2018, 
Radicacion n. 11001 22 03 000 2018 00319 00 (Colom.), http://climatecasechart.com/ 
non-us-case/future-generation-v-ministry-environment-others/.  
288. Id.  
289. Id. at 13. The available English translation of this opinion does not 
explicitly ground the decision in Colombia’s Constitution, but the opinion relies on 
the Atrato River case, which recognized natural resources as being protected by the 
constitution.  
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Like the Urgenda court, the Colombia Supreme Court relied on 
treaty obligations and scientific data, as well as the precautionary 
principle, to rule in favor of the plaintiffs.290 The court ordered the 
government to collaborate with the plaintiffs to formulate a plan to combat 
illegal deforestation.291  
VI. CONCLUSION—THE FUTURE OF THE PTD 
Professor Sax’s celebrated 1970 article foreshadowed much of the 
surprising development of the PTD during the past half-century, even 
though the article did not emphasize the rapid 19th century expansion of 
the scope of the doctrine inland that had moved the doctrine beyond 
coastal tidewaters.292 Nor did Sax anticipate the expansion of the doctrine 
to waterways traditionally considered to be non-navigable.293 Had Sax 
accounted for these developments, his prognosis for the future might have 
been more robust, although the doctrine’s great influence in India was 
hardly foreseeable.294 
 
290. Id.  
291. Id. at 45. Earlier, in 2016, the Colombian Constitutional Court upheld 
a citizen challenge to government inaction concerning illegal logging and mining of 
the Atrato River Basin. The court interpreted the Constitution as establishing “a 
fundamental obligation of the State and society to ensure the care of our natural 
resources,” recognized biocultural rights of ethnic communities, and declared there 
was a fundamental right to water. The court recognized the Atrato River as a legal 
person with rights to protection and restoration, adopted the precautionary principle 
concerning ecological preservation, and made numerous references to the need to 
safeguard the rights of future generations. To protect these fundamental rights, the 
court issued numerous structural injunctions, including calling for legal guardians to 
represent the river, an independent commission of experts, watershed restoration 
plans, and plans to revive local communities’ ability obtain clean subsistence and 
farming. See Center for Social Justice v. Presidency of the Republic, Judgment T-
622/16 (Const. Ct. Colombia 2016). Rights of nature were also recognized by an India 
High Court in 2017, in the so-called Glaciers Decision, remarking that “Rivers, 
Forests, Lakes, Water Bodies, Air, Glaciers and Springs have a right to exist, persist, 
maintain, sustain and regenerate their own vital ecology system. The rivers are not just 
water bodies. They are scientifically and biologically living.” Invoking parens patriae 
jurisdiction, the court gave “personhood” status to glaciers, rivers, streams, other 
waterbodies, jungles, forests, and grasslands to preserve and conserve them. Miglani 
v. State of Uttarakhand, Writ Pet. 140 (High Court of Uttarakhand, 2017).  
292. See supra notes 51–74 and accompanying text. 
293. See supra notes 75–87 and accompanying text. 
294. Sax’s article itself had great influence internationally, forming part of 
the bedrock of the India Supreme Court’s M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath decision, 1 
S.C.C. 388, at *16–21 (1997) (declaring the public trust doctrine part of “the law of 
the land” and striking down a land lease for a resort along the Beas River and ordering 
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Predicting the future is a hazardous enterprise, but one prediction 
that seems a safe bet is that the PTD in many jurisdictions will continue to 
expand to include more trust resources: not only traditionally non-
navigable waters,295 but also terrestrial resources such as wildlife, wildlife 
habitat,296 parklands,297 and perhaps forest resources298 seem likely 
additions to the trust res. This expansion could develop judicially or 
statutorily or, as increasingly occurring abroad, constitutionally. Apart 
from constitutional interpretations, the expansion might result from so-
called “tributary analysis,” under which a resource is subject to the public 
trust if it would adversely affect an acknowledged trust resource. This 
approach has already led courts to extend the trust res to beaches, non-
navigable streams, groundwater, and the atmosphere.299 Tributary 
analysis, if taken seriously scientifically, should lead to an ecological res, 
extending to all significant ecological resources.300 
Tributary analysis will not, however, lead courts to apply the PTD 
to the federal government. That application will depend on a reassessment 
of statements of Supreme Court dicta concerning a 1926 decision of the 
Court as construing the lodestar decision of Illinois Central to be grounded 
in state law.301 Properly interpreted, the PTD is an inherent limit on all 
sovereigns, including the federal government.302 That recognition would, 
 
restoration of the ecology of the area). See also M.I. Builders Private, Ltd. v. Radhey 
Shayam Sahu, (1999) 6 S.C.C. 464 (India). 
295. See supra notes 75–86 and accompanying text. 
296. See Michael C. Blumm & Aurora Paulsen, The Public Trust in 
Wildlife, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 1437 (2013). 
297. Parklands are public trust resources in a number of states like New 
York, Pennsylvania, and Illinois. See MICHAEL C. BLUMM & MARY C. WOOD, THE 
PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 343–
59 (3d ed. 2021) (collecting the case law). The National Park Service Organic Act, 16 
U.S.C. § 1(a) (2012), also contains trust language,“[t]he Secretary . . . shall promote 
and regulate the use of the National Park System . . . in such manner and by such 
means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.” 
298. See supra notes 188–210 (discussing Waiahole Ditch), note 295 
(citing cases from Columbia and India) and accompanying text. 
299. See supra notes 156–73 (beaches), notes 174–88 (non-navigable 
streams), notes 189–210 (groundwater), notes 222–43 (the atmosphere). 
300. See generally Mary Christina Wood, NATURE’S TRUST: 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR A NEW ECOLOGICAL AGE (2014). 
301. See supra notes 54–65 and accompanying text. A prescient student 
paper has deconstructed Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364 (1926), as an 
inaccurate foundation for the notion that the public trust doctrine recognized in Illinois 
Central 146 U.S. 387 (1892), was based on Illinois state law). See Michael Benjamin 
Smith, The Misunderstood Legacy of Appleby v. City of New York and Its Effects on 
the Federal Public Trust Doctrine (draft 2020). 
302. See Blumm & Shaffer, supra note 85. 
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among other things, prevent misguided alienations of federal lands or 
resources.303 
The trust will also likely be interpreted to include both 
precautionary and prevention principles.304 The former should reduce the 
need for scientific proof as a predicate for taking remedial action. The 
latter would require sovereigns to take affirmative steps to prevent adverse 
effects on trust resources rather than merely reducing or compensating for 
adverse effects. The trust’s application to government funding decisions 
will also likely become more commonplace.305  
Not to be overlooked are the criteria by which courts judge 
governments’ implementation of trust duties. Private trust principles, like 
prudence, loyalty, and impartiality, may become more prominent,306 
although due to the fact that future generations are beneficiaries of the 
trust, some modifications of private trust principles seem in order. The 
duties imposed on conservation easement trustees may be a more 
appropriate model than private law trustee principles.307 Unlike American 
courts, foreign courts have not constrained themselves through standing, 
political question, and separation of powers doctrines.308 Instead, they 
have readily issued injunctive relief requiring the political branches to 
establish institutions to implement the public trust. Examples include The 
Philippines Supreme Court in Metro Manila,309 the Pakistan Supreme 
Court in Balochistan,310 and the Colombia Constitutional Court in the 
Atrato River case.311 
A fairly well settled area of public trust law is its utility as a 
background principle defending claims of regulatory takings.312 State 
 
303. Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 453.  
304. See supra notes 189–210 and accompanying text (discussing 
Waiahole Ditch). The Atrato River decision, supra note 295, contained detailed 
explanations of why both the precautionary principle and the prevention principle 
should be part of trust jurisprudence. 
305. The landmark case applying the PTD to funding decisions was 
Pennsylvania Environmental Rights Foundation, discussed supra notes 211–21 and 
accompanying text. 
306. The bellwether case was again Pennsylvania Environmental Rights 
Foundation, supra notes 220–21 and accompanying text (invoking private law 
principles). 
307. See Dernbach, supra note 215. 
308. The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Juliana serves as a prime example, 
see supra note 269 and accompanying text. 
309. See supra note 262–63 and accompanying text. 
310. See supra note 282–85 and accompanying text. 
311. See supra note 295. 
312. See Michael C. Blumm & Rachel G. Wolfard, Revisiting Background 
Principles in Takings Litigation, 71 FLA. L. REV. 1165 (2019), updating and largely 
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courts have widely embraced the PTD as a background principle, and 
courts have even recognized trust-like declarations in states concerning 
ownership of wildlife and water as background principles defenses to 
takings claims.313 Unless the U.S. Supreme Court redefines the 
background principles defense recognized by Justice Scalia in Lucas v. 
South Carolina Coastal Council,314 the public trust doctrine is likely to 
serve as a primary takings defense in the years ahead.315 
The PTD may also be expanded through trust language in several 
federal statutes. For example, the National Park Service Organic Act 
requires the National Park Service to “conserve the scenery and the natural 
and historic objects and the wild life therein and to provide for the 
enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such means as will leave 
them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.316 Similarly, 
several federal statutes authorize designated trustees to seek natural 
resources damages for water, oil, and hazardous waste pollution.317 And 
 
confirming the conclusions reached in Michael C. Blumm & Lucus Ritchie, Lucas’ 
Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of Background Principles as Categorical Takings 
Defenses, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 321 (2005). 
313. See Blumm & Wolfard, supra note 312, at 1183–86, 1195–1200. 
314. 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992). Although the Lucas case has been 
heralded as establishing the background principles defense, it was actually first 
recognized Justice Holmes’ decision in Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 
U.S. 349, 356 (1908) (“This public interest is omnipresent wherever there is a state, 
and grows more pressing as population grows. It is fundamental, and we are of opinion 
that the private property of riparian proprietors cannot be supposed to have deeper 
roots. Whether it be said that such an interest justifies the cutting down by statute, 
without compensation, in the exercise of the police power, of what otherwise would 
be private rights of property, or that, apart from statute, those rights do not go to the 
height of what the defendant seeks to do, the result is the same.”).  
315. The Court’s decision in Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162 
(2019), may affect the interpretation of background principles by expanding court 
review of state regulations alleged to have worked takings. See John D. Echeverria, 
Knick v. Township of Scott: A Procedural Boost for Takings Claimants, 51 ABA 
TRENDS no. 3 at 7 (2020).  
316. National Park Service Organic Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
317. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(5) 
(2012) (“The President . . . shall act on behalf of the public as trustee of the natural 
resources to recover for the costs of replacing or restoring such resources.”); Oil 
Pollution Act of 1990 33 U.S.C. § 2706(b)(1) (2012) (“The President . . . shall act on 
behalf of the public . . . as trustee of natural resources to present a claim for and to 
recover damages to the natural resources.”); Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Liability, and Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1) (2012) (“The 
President . . . shall act on behalf of the public as trustee of such natural resources to 
recover for such damages.”); see also John C. Cruden & Matthew R. Oakes, The Past, 
Present, and Future of Natural Resource Damages Claims, 28 GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. 291 
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of course the fundamental National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 
contains trust language that has been widely ignored by the courts. Perhaps 
a court will recognize that Congress intended to establish a federal trust 
when it established “a national policy to create and maintain conditions 
under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill 
the social, economic, and other requirements of present and future 
generations of Americans . . . fulfill[ing]the responsibilities of each 
generation as trustee of the environment for succeeding generations.”318 If 
that language were taken seriously by reviewing courts, the results would 
parallel some of the international decisions that Professor Sax’s article has 
influenced and more than achieve his vision of a half-century ago. 
 
(2016) (discussing natural resource damage claims, which can only be brought by the 
trustee responsible for the resource).  
318. 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (a) & (b)(1). 
